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1Abstract
Recent lobbying scandals involving Jack Abramoff and Representative Tom DeLay have 
created a much-needed impetus for legislative reform of the lobbying process.  But the question 
cries out:  Will Congress actually enact any of the multitude of reform proposals currently on the 
table and, even if it does, will any of those reforms make a difference in how the lobbying 
process operates?  History suggests that the answer is “No.”
This paper examines the reasons for Congress’ persistent failure to enact effective 
lobbying reform, and posits that the primary cause is an underlying disjunct between legislators’ 
versus the public’s views about the value of lobbying.  I argue that before effective lobbying 
reform can be achieved, a fundamental shift in the philosophy underlying lobbying regulation 
must take place.  The basic problem with existing lobbying regulations  and with all of the 
reforms currently under consideration by Congress  is that they focus on disclosure by 
lobbyists alone, leaving the elected officials whom lobbyists target, and the interest groups 
behind the lobbyists, essentially unregulated.  I advocate that lobbying regulations instead (1) 
should require disclosures by elected officials about official-lobbyist contacts; and (2) should 
seek to capitalize on interest group competition for access to legislators as a means of 
disseminating lobbying disclosures to the voting public, and of generating more even-handed 
political contact by elected officials with interests on different sides of an issue.
In this manner, lobbying regulations both would produce more substantively informative 
disclosures and would ensure that the voting public pays some attention to such disclosures, 
while also creating an incentive for elected officials to increase their own exposure to differing 
viewpoints before rendering policy decisions.  As a result, voter competence at the ballot box, as 
well as the quality of legislative outcomes, should improve. 
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Introduction
Lobbying long has been a dirty word in the eyes of the American public.  The images it 
conjures are many, from well-dressed political types casually peddling their clients’ cases before
elected officials over fancy four-course meals, to brackish political hacks cornering members of 
Congress in House and Senate lobbies, to hired guns offering campaign contributions and other 
financial incentives in exchange for unspoken future allegiance from elected officials.  Public 
distrust of lobbying is as old as the profession itself, and efforts to regulate or reform the 
lobbying process, not coincidentally, have been a perennial agenda item in Congress.
In fact, in the twentieth century alone, lobbying reform has been the subject of over 
fifteen congressional investigations and has resulted in at least as many hearings and legislative 
markups.1 Such congressional efforts typically have followed on the heels of highly publicized 
1 See, e.g., Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate on 
S. Res. 92, A Resolution Instructing the Committee on the Judiciary to Investigate the Charge That a 
Lobby Is Maintained to Influence Legislation Pending in the Senate, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913) (special 
investigation of tariff lobbying); Hearings Before the Select Comm. of the House of Representatives 
Appointed Under H.R. 198, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913) (investigation of alleged unscrupulous lobbying 
by the National Association of Manufacturers); H.R. 15,466, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) (bill introduced 
after NAM investigation); S. REP. NO. 43, 71st Cong, 1st Sess. (1929-1930) (investigation into lobbying 
improprieties involving Manufacturers Association of Connecticut); Hearings Before a Subcomm. Of the 
Comm. on Naval Affairs, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929-1930) (investigations into lobbyist efforts to sink the 
Geneva Naval Limitation Conference); Hearings Before a Special Comm. to Investigate Lobbying 
Activities, 74th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1935-1936) (investigation into lobbying activities of the utility 
industry); Registration and Regulation of Lobbyists:  Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate 
Judiciary Comm., 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935) (investigations on lobbying improprieties generally); 
H.R. REP. NO. 2214, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) (drafted in response to investigation of public utilities 
lobbying); Hearings Before the House Select Comm.. on Lobbying Activities, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) 
(general lobbying reform investigation); H. R. REP. NO. 3137, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), Expenditures 
by Corporations to Influence Legislation; H.R. REP. NO. 3238, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1951), Expenditures 
by Farm and Labor Organizations to Influence Legislation; H.R. REP. NO. 3239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1951), Report and Recommendations on Federal Lobbying Act; Congress and Pressure Groups, S. Print 
161, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 48 (1986) [hereinafter Congress and Pressure Groups] (hearings instituted by 
Senator Case after receiving bribe offer for his vote on natural gas bill); The Special Committee to 
Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying, and Campaign Contributions, S. REP. NO. 395, 85th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1957) (special committee investigation of alleged lobbying improprieties involving the Natural Gas 
Act, the Federal Highway Act, and sugar legislation); Regulation of Lobbying, Hearings Before the 
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, H. Res. 1031, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (investigation 
driven by scandals involving, inter alia, Lyndon Johnson aide Bobby Baker); Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (explaining that there were 34 bills introduced in the House regarding lobbying 
and disclosure in one year); Hearings Before the Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 
(1975); Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1979:  Hearings Before the House comm.. on Governmental Affairs, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Federal Lobbying Disclosure Laws:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
3lobbying scandals.  Recent efforts to reform the lobbying process, including the Special Interest 
Lobbying and Ethics Accountability Act (“SILEAA”),2 introduced by Representatives Meehan 
and Emmanuel, and the Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act of 2005 (“LTAA”),3
introduced by Senator John McCain, are no exception — predictably having followed in the 
wake of well-publicized scandals involving lobbyist Jack Abramoff4 and Representative Tom 
DeLay.5  But if past experience is any indication, any lobbying reforms enacted as a result of 
these scandals — if, indeed, any reforms are enacted at all — are unlikely to effect substantial 
change in the way that lobbying is regulated, let alone practiced. 
This paper examines the reasons for Congress’ persistent failure to enact effective
lobbying reform, and argues that a fundamental shift in the philosophy underlying lobbying
regulation is in order.  Currently, lobbying is regulated under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 
19956 (“the LDA”) and related House and Senate rules restricting gift-giving by lobbyists to 
members of Congress.7 All pending proposals to reform the lobbying process, including the 
SILEAA and LTAA, are styled as amendments to the LDA, ostensibly designed to expand the 
reach and efficacy of disclosure,8 revolving door,9 and gift reporting10 requirements already 
Oversight of Gov’t Management, Comm. on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(June 20, July 16, and Sept. 25, 1991).  
2 See H.R. 2412, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 17, 2005).
3 See S. 2128, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 16, 2005).  See also Lobbying and Ethics Reform Act 
of 2005, S. 1398, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 14, 2005); Stealth Lobbyist Disclosure Act of 2005, H.R. 
1302 and H.R. 1304, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 4, 2005 & Mar. 15, 2005); Lobby Gift Ban Act of 2005, 
H.R. 3177, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 30, 2005); Terrorist Lobby Disclosure Act of 2005, S. 1972, 109th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 7, 2005); H.R. 3623, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 29, 2005) (a bill to increase to 5 
years the period during which former Members of Congress may not engage in certain lobbying 
activities); H. Res. 81, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 9, 2005) (directing the House Clerk to post on official 
House website all lobbying registrations and reports filed with the Clerk under the LDA).
4 See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Official Tipped Abramoff on Client’s Case, Filing Says, NEW YORK 
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at 120; Carl Hulse, Abramoff Conviction Gives New Impetus to Moves in Congress 
to Toughen Curbs on Lobbying, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 1, 2006, at A18.
5 See, e.g., Anne E. Kornblut and Glenn Justice, Inquiry Focusing on Second Firm with 
Connections to DeLay, NEW YORK TIMES, January 8, 2006, at 11; Marie Cocco, DeLay’s Worst: A Dirty 
Drama of Bondage, NEWSDAY, May 9, 2005, at A34 (describing public outrage over reports that 
lobbyists paid for a Scottish golf junket taken by DeLay, his wife, and aides).
6
 Pub. L. 104-65, §2, 109 Stat. 691 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §1601-1612 (1997) and other 
scattered sections).
7 See S. Res. 158, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H. Res. 250, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The 
bans were adopted separately by each chamber in the form of resolutions and, inter alia, limit the value of 
gifts — e.g., meals and entertainment — that members of Congress may accept from lobbyists (no 
individual gift may exceed $50 in value and no more than $100 in cumulative gifts may given by any one 
source), as well as prohibit senators and representatives from accepting free travel to substantially 
recreational events such as charity trips where congressmen and lobbyists golf and ski together to raise 
money for charities.
8
 Title I of the LTAA, labeled “Enhanced Lobbying Disclosure,” for example, amends the LDA 
to provide for, inter alia, quarterly filings of lobbying disclosure reports, electronic filing of such reports, 
creation of a public database for accessing such reports, application of the LDA’s disclosure requirements 
4imposed by the Act and House and Senate gift rules.  Not surprisingly given their common 
starting point, existing lobbying regulations and their proposed reforms all suffer from the same 
flaw:  They are classic cases of “symbolic legislation,”11 designed to appease the public 
superficially without effecting any real change in how elected officials conduct business with 
lobbyists, or the interest groups whom they represent.  Moreover, the LDA, internal rules, and 
pending reform proposals all make lobbyists — rather than the legislators whom they target or 
the interest groups whom they represent — the focal point of lobbying regulation.  Worse, they
cast Congress as a victim, or at least a passive actor, in the lobbying process,12 essentially 
ignoring the public’s underlying concerns about the influence that lobbyists exercise over 
legislators.
I argue that the key to effective lobbying reform is to abandon this misguided approach to
lobbying regulation, with its focus on lobbyists as the main actors, and disclosures about who 
hires lobbyists as magical cure-alls  that somehow will increase “public confidence in the 
integrity of government.”13  If lobbying reform is to be meaningful, it should regulate not only 
lobbyists, but also those actors with whom the public is most concerned — i.e., the elected 
officials whom lobbyists seek to influence. Further, if lobbying reform is to be both meaningful 
and successful, it should take into account a third, currently overlooked, set of actors in the 
lobbying process — the interest groups who hire lobbyists to represent their positions.  In other 
words, lobbying reform should become less concerned with disclosure for the sake of disclosure 
and more concerned with the dynamics created by disclosure — i.e., with how disclosures will
be used and who they can benefit in the legislative process.
The conventional wisdom behind congressional lobbying regulation thus far has been that 
requiring lobbyists to disclose their clients’ names and lobbying expenditures will cause the 
clients (i.e., interests) and lobbyists to behave in a more open and honest manner.  But the more 
likely real world consequence of disclosure requirements is that they will enable those actors 
with the greatest capacity to capitalize on information in the lobbying game — interest groups —
better to police each other’s activities, contacts, and expenditures on a given issue.  Although the 
to grassroots lobbying, and increased penalties for violations of the LDA’s disclosure requirements.  See
S. 2128, §§ 101-103, 105, 107, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 16, 2005).  SILEAA provides for these same 
expansions, in virtually identical language.  See H.R. 2412, §§ 101-103, 106,  402, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(May 17, 2005).
9 See S. 2128, §§ 201-203, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 16, 2005) (“Title II – Slowing the 
Revolving Door”); H.R. 2412, §§ 201-203, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 17, 2005) (“Title II – Slowing the 
Revolving Door”).  
10 See S. 2128, §§ 301-304, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 16, 2005) (“Title III – Curbing Excesses 
In Privately Funded Travel and Lobbyist Gifts”); H.R. 2412, §§ 301-304, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 17, 
2005) (“Title III – Curbing Excesses In Privately Funded Travel”) (providing travel and gift restrictions 
only slightly different from those in the Senate bill).
11
 For detailed discussions of symbolic legislation, see MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES 
OF POLITICS (1964); John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 
(1990).
12 See discussion infra Section II.C.2__.
13
 16 U.S.C. §1601(1) (1995).
5public may not realize it, this is not necessarily a bad thing.  In fact, greater transparency and 
increased monitoring across interest groups could lead to more balanced political participation by 
interests on both sides of an issue, as opposing groups seek to match or “check” each other’s 
efforts in true Madisonian fashion.14  Thus, the key to more effective lobbying regulation may be 
to embrace the fact that interest groups are the entities with the greatest incentive to take 
advantage of lobbying disclosures and, accordingly, to structure lobbying regulations in a 
manner that encourages organized interests, in maximizing their own positions, also to further 
public goals.
Part I of this paper highlights the symbolic nature of the LDA, illustrating that the statute
was designed to enable legislators publicly to claim credit for imposing restrictions on the 
lobbying process, while in practice permitting lobbyists to conduct business as usual.  It also 
explores how the LDA fails the public, analyzing the public’s concerns about lobbying and 
positing that there is a disjunct between public versus congressional perceptions of the role 
played by lobbyists in the legislative process.  Part II discusses the goals that a public-regarding, 
rather than symbolic, approach to lobbying regulation might seek to achieve — including 
improved voter competence and more informed legislating.  Part III argues that the key to 
accomplishing such public-regarding reform of the LDA is to focus not on lobbyists, as Congress 
has done for the past two centuries, but on the two entities between which lobbyists mediate:  
elected officials and interest groups.  First, the Act’s disclosure requirements should be expanded 
to require information from elected officials, in the both the legislative and executive branches,
as well as from lobbyists.  Second, reforms to the LDA should be designed to take advantage of 
interest groups’ natural incentives to use disclosed information to increase their access to elected 
officials and to make disclosed information accessible to the public.  Part III ends by outlining 
specific reforms to the LDA suggested by an interest-group-based approach to lobbying 
regulation, and compares and contrasts these suggested reforms with proposals contained in 
pending reform bills.  Part IV discusses the political conditions that must exist in order for 
Congress to enact the suggested reforms, and possible strategies for creating such conditions.
I. THE LOBBYING DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1995: SYMBOLIC REFORM
A. How and Why the LDA is A “Symbolic” Statute
Unlike most lobbying reform efforts, the LDA was not drafted in response to any 
particular lobbying scandal.  Rather, it represented the effectuation of a series of campaign 
promises — by Ross Perot and Bill Clinton in 1992 and by Republican congressional candidates 
in 1994 — to change the way that lobbying was practiced in Washington, D.C., and to curb the 
14 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 56 (Madison) (J. Cooke, ed. 1961).  See also discussion infra
Section III.A, pp. __.
6influence wielded by special interests in the lawmaking process.15 Thus, the Act’s preamble 
emphasizes the public’s right to be informed about behind-the-scenes activities that impact the 
formation of public policy.  In fact, the preamble lists three congressional findings that form the 
basis for the Act’s provisions:  (1) that responsible representative government requires public 
awareness of the efforts of paid lobbyists to influence the public decision-making process of the 
federal government; (2) that existing lobbying disclosure statutes have been ineffective because 
of unclear statutory language and weak administrative and enforcement provisions; and (3) that 
effective public disclosure of the identity and extent of paid lobbyists’ efforts to influence federal 
officials would increase public confidence in the integrity of government.16 The disclosure 
provisions that follow the preamble, however, borrow wholesale from lobbying reform bills 
drafted in prior years.  Thus, the LDA, like all previous congressional lobbying proposals,17
focuses almost exclusively on regulating lobbyists — rather than the federal officials whom they 
contact — and operates on the fundamental premise that simple disclosure of the names of 
lobbyists’ clients, issue areas, and the amounts expended on lobbying will revolutionize the way
15 See, e.g., Warren P. Strobel, Clinton Says Lobby-Reform Bill Will ‘Pull Back The Curtains’, 
Measure Reflects Bipartisan Consensus, Has Major Curbs, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1995, at A8 (Clinton 
called for lobbying reform in his State of the Union Address; lobbying reform was a plank in House 
Republicans’ “Contract With America”); Nancy Watzman, Indecent Disclosure, Public Citizen’s 
Congress Watch Report (Mar. 1993) in Lobbying Disclosure Legislation:  Hearing Before the House 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 90 (1995) (attachment to statement of Joan 
Claybrook, President, Public Citizen) (noting that “theme” of 1992 elections was public disgust over 
“business as usual” in Washington and that voters responded eagerly when candidates such as Ross Perot 
and Bill Clinton decried special interest influence; commenting that President Clinton drew continued 
attention to special interest lobbying after taking office, by calling for reform of disclosure laws in his 
State of the Union address); Jonathan D. Salant, Members Urge Action on Lobbying Issue, 1995 CONG. 
Q. 2857 (Sept. 23, 1995) (reporting that the LDA was being pushed through in part by Republican 
freshmen seeking to live up to their campaign pledges); Bill Targets Lobbying Loopholes, 1995 CONG. Q.
3477 (Nov. 11, 1995) (same).
16 See 2 U.S.C. §1601(1).
17 See, e.g., H.R. 15,466, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) (bill introduced in response to 1913 lobbying 
scandal involving the National Manufacturer’s Association, which would have imposed registration and 
disclosure requirements on all lobbyists); S. 1095, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) (lobbyist registration and 
reporting measure, called the Caraway resolution, contemplated in the wake of a lobbying scandal 
involving the Connecticut Manufacturer’s Association); Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22
U.S.C. §611, et. seq. (1938) (provision requiring all persons who are agents of foreign principals to file 
informational statements with the State Department); Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. §1225 
(1936) (provision requiring registration by those who presented, advocated or opposed matters within the 
scope of the Merchant Marine Act and related shipping legislation before Congress, the Federal Maritime 
Board, or the Secretary of Commerce); Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. §§261-270 (1988)
(requiring disclosures, by lobbyists, of contacts with members of Congress).
7that lobbying is practiced.  The result is symbolic legislation18 that promises sweeping change 
but delivers lobbying as usual.
For beyond elected officials’ surface rhetoric,19 the LDA discernibly is more concerned 
with appearances than with substantive reform.  The statute nowhere even purports to require or 
promote any change in how lobbyists behave; in fact, the Act’s preamble makes clear that it 
seeks only to ensure that all lobbyists make publicly available information about their clients, 
funding, and the issue areas with respect to which they lobby.20  Likewise, Congress, in enacting 
the LDA, made no claims that its regulations would require lobbyists to alter their business 
practices.  Rather, the congressional pitch was that if the LDA forced lobbyists to disclose their 
client’s names, lobbying expenditures, and the issues on which they advocate to the public, then 
the principles of representative government would be served and “public confidence in the
18 Scholars have coined the term “symbolic legislation” to describe a law whose primary purpose 
is to appease public demand for action while in practice effecting little of what it promises.  See, e.g., 
EDELMAN, supra note 11, at 22-29; Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. 
Contemp. Legal Issues 717, 733-34 (2005).  As Beth Garrett has explained, symbolic legislation is “an 
attempt to defuse an issue that has roused a normally quiescent and inattentive public while leaving the 
underlying process of lawmaking, bargaining, and interest group interaction largely unchanged.”  Id. at 
733-34.
19
 Congress, for example, widely touted the LDA, and the gift ban resolutions that followed, as 
breakthroughs in lobbying regulation that would “chang[e] the political culture in Washington.”  Jonathan 
D. Salant & Richard Sammon, Senate Bans Lavish Gifts From Interest Groups, 1995 CONG. Q., July 29, 
1995, at 2237 (quoting Senator Paul Wellstone comments about the gift ban).  See also id. at 2237 
(quoting Senator William Cohen’s remarks that “[t]here has been a major step forward. . . [o]verall, we 
can claim we moved the institution toward reform); 141 CONG. REC. S10845, S10857 (July 28, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Hatfield) (commenting that LDA and Senate gift rule reforms “take significant steps” 
to improve the lobbying process); 140 CONG. REC. H10283, H10285 (Sept. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. 
Cantwell commenting that the 1993 bill upon which the 1995 LDA was based includes the “broadcast 
[sic] and strictest lobbying disclosure requirements ever enacted” and “permanently limits the influence 
of the lobbyists and special interests on Capitol Hill”); Lobbying Disclosure Act, 140 CONG. REC. H1966, 
H1987 (Mar. 24, 1994) (comments to same effect by Representative Hoyer).  President Clinton similarly 
promised that the LDA would help “give ordinary Americans a greater stake in our government” by 
“pull[ing] back the curtains from the world of Washington lobbying” and ensuring that “the days of secret 
lobbying are over.”  President William J. Clinton, Remarks By the President at Signing Ceremony for the 
Lobbying Dislosure Act of 1995 (Dec. 19, 1995), available at
http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/121995-speech-by-president-at-lobbying-reform-bill-
signing.htm (last checked June 30, 2005).
20 See 2 U.S.C. §1601(1).
8integrity of government” (automatically) would increase.21  In other words, Congress designed 
the LDA not to repair improprieties in the lobbying system, but to shed light on the lobbying 
industry in the hopes that if it educated the public about the true operation of the lobbying 
process, it could “erase the appearance of impropriety” popularly associated with lobbyists’ 
activities.22
There also was some suggestion by those drafting the LDA that the Act’s disclosure 
requirements might lead to better lobbying practices on the part of lobbyists and their clients by 
revealing links between lobbying expenditures and success in the legislative process.23  But the 
suggestion was little more than rhetoric, given that the LDA’s provisions do not require detailed 
disclosures about specific issues, proposals, votes, or pieces of legislation concerning which a 
lobbyist is hired to advocate or about specific officials whom a lobbyist might contact,24 or
provide for any disclosure whatsoever about the success or failure of lobbyists’ activities on 
behalf of a client.25  Thus, even if Lobbyist X were to disclose that he lobbied the House of 
Representatives on behalf of Client A regarding Issue Q, and even if a watchful public citizen 
knew that the House reported out a bill dealing with Issue Q, it would be difficult for the citizen 
to gauge Lobbyist X’s success without knowing client A’s preferences regarding specific
21 See discussion supra Section I.A & n.16 and accompanying text, p. __ (quoting congressional 
findings in 2 U.S.C. §1601(1)).  See also Overhauling the Lobbying Disclosure Laws: Hearing on the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1995), available at 1995 WL 527076 (statement of Sen. Levin) (“Lobbying disclosure will enhance 
public confidence in government by ensuring that the public is aware of the efforts that are made by paid 
lobbyists to influence public policy.”) [hereinafter Hearing:  Overhauling the Lobbying Disclosure 
Laws];  Phil Kuntz, New Lobbying Reform Bill Has Watchdog’s OK Passage Predicted, But Groups 
Agree It Still Leaves Some Loopholes, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 30, 1994, at A4 (noting, with respect to 1993 
bill on which the LDA is based, that “[s]upporters envision a sunshine-filled world of computerized and 
cross-indexed data that will illuminate how power is leveraged in Washington – thus producing a better-
informed public and a more perfect democracy”).
22 Reform of Laws Governing Lobbying:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (1995) (statement of committee chairman, Rep.
Canaday) (expressing hope that through the LDA Congress “can work to bring the relationship between 
lobbyists and government officials into the light and erase the appearance of impropriety from their 
dealings”) (emphasis added).
23 See, e.g., Hearing:  Overhauling the Lobbying Disclosure Laws, supra note __, (statement of 
Sen. Levin) (“In some cases, such disclosure will perhaps encourage lobbyists and their clients to be 
sensitive to even the appearance of improper influence.”).
24 See 2 U.S.C. §1603(b) (listing information that lobbyists are required to include in their 
registration reports).
25 See 2 U.S.C. §1603(b)(5)(A) & (B) (requiring lobbyists to identify the “general issue areas”
regarding which they expect to lobby for the named client and leaving it in lobbyists’ discretion to 
disclose “to the extent practicable” specific issue “areas” — not specific bill provisions, preferences, or 
stances — on which they already have lobbied).
9components of Issue Q and how those preferences were reflected in, or rejected by, the bill 
passed by the House.26
Second, the disclosures required by the Act are minimal, and are made in a format that is 
neither easily accessible nor decipherable by average citizens.  Currently, lobbyists comply with 
the Act by filling out forms created by the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate 
and return these forms to the Clerk’s and Secretary’s offices, where the forms are reviewed and 
then made available to the public — in hard copy at the Legislative Resource Center and at the 
Senate Office of Public Records in Washington, D.C. and, to a more limited extent, online 
through the Senate’s official website.27  In keeping with the Act’s requirements, the form 
consists primarily of lines asking lobbying firms to list the name, address, and principal place of 
business of: (1) the registering lobbying firm; (2) the client on whose behalf the firm has or will 
engage in lobbying; (3) any affiliated organization that has contributed more than $10,000 
towards the registering firm’s lobbying activities; and (4) any foreign entities that hold at least 
20% ownership in the client or any of its affiliated organizations.28  A very small section asks 
lobbyists to list a three-letter code describing their “general lobbying issue areas” and then to 
describe their “specific lobbying issues (current and anticipated)”.29  Such disclosures do not go 
very far towards enlightening the public.  For although the names of lobbying firms, individual 
lobbyists, and even clients may have currency for members of Congress who deal with these 
entities on a regular basis, they are of little use or relevance to average members of the public.  
Further, the LDA requires lobbyists to reveal little information regarding the 
governmental officials whom they contact.  In fact, lobbyists need only state generally that they 
contacted the House of Representatives or the Senate or a particular federal agency such as the 
Department of Energy at large, rather than specify individual legislators, committees, or federal 
26
 A lobbying client’s preferences on an issue usually are more complicated and multi-faceted 
than a simple “yes” or “no” position on a bill, and lobbyist “success” on a particular issue is rarely 
complete.  See Diana M. Evans, Lobbying the Committee: Interest Groups and the House Public Works 
and Transportation Committee, in ALLAN J. CIGLER & BURDETT A. LOOMIS, INTEREST GROUP POLITICS
257, 257 (3d Ed., 1991).  Most members of the public do not have access to lobbying clients’ preference 
breakdowns and, in any event, are not willing to do the research necessary to piece together various 
pieces of disclosed information; thus, it is highly unlikely that the disclosure requirements imposed by the 
LDA would frighten lobbyists or their clients into changing their lobbying practices in any substantial 
manner. 
27 See Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives Website, available at
http://clerk.house.gov/pd/; Lobbying Disclosure Page of Senate Website, available at
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/g_three_sections_with_teasers/lobbyingdisc.htm (last 
reviewed July 1, 2005).
28 See, e.g., United States Lobby Report Images, 2005 Mid-Year Termination Lobbying Report of 
Paul Marcone & Assocs., LLC, on behalf of client MercyHurst College, available at
http://sopr.senate.gov/cgi-win/opr_gifviewer.exe?/2005/01/000/212/000212190|2; 2005 Year-End 
Lobbying Report of Parents as Teachers Center on behalf of itself, available at http://sopr.senate.gov/cgi-
win/opr_gifviewer.exe?/2005/01/000/012/000012626|4 (through link in United States Senate Office of 
Public Records website).
29 See, e.g., id.
10
employees with whom they corresponded.30   It is difficult to see how the American public is to
derive from such vague, general disclosures a better understanding of the manner in which the 
lobbying process operates, let alone gain renewed faith in its elected officials or in the integrity 
of its government.
Finally, the fact that the LDA is a primarily symbolic law is evident from its weak 
enforcement provisions.  The sole penalty for violation of the Act’s registration provisions is a 
judicially-imposed civil fine of up to $50,000.31  For lobbying firms that earn anywhere from 
hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars in revenues each year,32 this is barely a slap on the 
wrist.  Further, only the United States District Attorney for the District of Columbia has authority 
to prosecute violations of the Act,33 and the Act leaves unclear how that office is to gain evidence 
of such violations.
B. Behind the Symbolism: Why Current Lobbying Regulations Fail the Public
Perhaps more important than understanding that there is a disconnect between what the 
LDA promises and what it delivers is understanding why that disconnect exists.  Subsection 1
below analyzes the public’s concerns about lobbying and special interests, arguing that the public 
cares primarily about lobbyists’ (and their clients’) ability, both through money and through 
insider access, to exert undue influence over elected officials.  Yet the LDA paradoxically 
ignores the role of elected officials in the lobbying process and pays almost no attention to the 
importance of lobbyist access, as distinct from monetary contributions, to elected officials.  
Subsection 2 examines why Congress responded to the public’s concerns with the symbolic 
LDA.  In addition to being externally constrained by the First Amendment, I argue that Congress 
structured the LDA as it did because it:  (1) believes that the public misunderstands 
and is unduly critical of lobbyists’ role in the legislative process, (2) wishes to continue its 
existing financial and informational relationships with lobbyists, and (3) prefers to avoid 
subjecting itself to the burden of complying with lobbying disclosure regulations.
1.  The Public’s Concerns About Lobbying
The public perceives two main categories of problems with the lobbying process: quid 
pro quos and unequal access.  First, the public fears that through campaign contributions,
personal gifts, and perhaps even outright bribery, lobbyists make elected officials beholden to 
30 See 2 U.S.C. §1604(b)(2)B).
31 See 2 U.S.C. §1606.  Section 12(b) of the LDA, which amends 18 U.S.C. §219(a) to make it 
illegal for public officials to act as lobbyists in connection with the representation of a foreign entity, is 
the only part of the LDA that creates any criminal sanctions.  See also 18 U.S.C. §219(a) (Supp. 1997).
32 See, e.g., Andy Metzger and Anna Palmer, In ‘04 Returns, A Landslide for Lobbyists, Broward  
Dly. Bus. Rev. at 9 (Mar. 24, 2005) (reporting that top 50 Washington lobbying firms earned more than 
$840 million in fees in 2004, and cataloguing individual firms’ revenues as follows: Patton Boggs ($65.8 
million), Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld ($64.2 million), Hogan & Hartson ($51 million), DLA Piper 
Rudnick Gray Cary ($42.4 million), and Preston Gates Ellis & Rouvelas Meeds ($21.4 million)). 
33 See 2 U.S.C. §1605(8).
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them.34  As a result, it believes, lobbyists are able to exert undue influence on the policymaking 
process by pressuring elected officials to vote in their clients’ interests on threat of otherwise 
losing the lobbyists’ financial support.35  Such beliefs are fueled by scandals such as Senator 
Francis Case’s revelation in 1956 that he was offered a $2500 campaign contribution to influence 
his vote on a pending natural gas bill36 and President Clinton’s 2001 pardon of fugitive 
commodities trader Marc Rich amidst disclosures that Rich’s wife, who lobbied for the pardon, 
had contributed heavily to Clinton’s library foundation.37 For the most part, Congress has sought 
to address these types of quid pro quo concerns through laws other than the LDA.  For example, 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197138 (“FECA”) and its successor, the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 200239 (“BCRA”), seek both to prevent the actual purchasing of 
elected officials by special interests, and to dispel the appearance that elected officials can be 
purchased, by setting limits on campaign contributions and requiring such contributions to be 
disclosed.40  In addition, a federal anti-bribery statute outlaws the giving and receiving of quid 
pro quos in general,41 and the House and Senate gift ban resolutions implemented in 1995 aim to 
34 See, e.g., Hearings on Lobby Reform Legislation, Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess., at p. (15? 18?) (Apr.-Nov. 1975) (quoted in Congress and Pressure Groups, supra
note 1, at 59) (describing wide-spread public view that government is the “puppet of wealthy citizens and 
powerful interest groups”).
35
 Common Cause representative Fred Wertheimer’s comments before Congress are illustrative:
The single most important factor . . . in undermining public confidence in the 
integrity of Congress and its ability to make decisions on the merits, is the role 
being played by PAC contributions . . . PACs are generally tied to groups that 
regularly conduct organized lobbying efforts, and campaign contributions are an 
integral part of these efforts . . . . PACs, through campaign contributions, are 
creating a higher obligation for our representatives, an obligation to serve PAC 
interests, first and foremost.
Congress and Pressure Groups, supra note 1, at 22 (quoting 1983 Lobby Hearings at 39 (statement of 
Common Cause representative Fred Wertheimer)).
36 See Congress and Pressure Groups, supra note 1, at 47.
37
 Denise Rich reportedly gave at least $450,000 to President Clinton’s library foundation.  See, 
e.g., Marc Lacey, Political Memo; Resurrecting Ghosts of Pardons Past, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2001, at 
126 (discussing, inter alia, the “appearance of a quid pro quo”); Don Van Natta & David Johnston, 
Clinton Library Will Yield Details on Big Donations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at A9.  The incident 
drew sharp criticism from Congress as well.  See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S3154-56 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 
2001) (statement by Sen. Arlen Specter) (noting that Clinton’s last minute pardons had sparked public 
outrage and commenting that this was “rightly so”).
38
 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (Feb. 7, 1972) (codified as amended in 2 U.S.C. §§431-455 
(2000)).
39
 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.A. 
(West 2005)).
40 See John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 SO. CAL. L. REV. 591, 
593 (2005).
41 See 18 U.S.C. §201.
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eliminate the appearance of undue influence by prohibiting lobbyists from wining and dining 
elected officials.42  The LDA itself addresses the public’s concerns about quid pro quo corruption 
only minimally, through the requirement that lobbyists disclose the amounts that their clients 
have paid for their lobbying activities.43
Second, and perhaps more troubling to the public than the fear of outright bribery, is the 
special access, or inside edge, that lobbyists maintain in communicating with elected officials.  
Whether because of the “revolving door”44 or because of other close personal connections,45 the 
42
 The bans limit, inter alia, the value of gifts — e.g., meals and entertainment — that members 
of Congress may accept from lobbyists (no individual gift may exceed $50 in value and no more than 
$100 in cumulative gifts may given by any one source), as well as prohibit senators and representatives 
from accepting free travel to substantially recreational events such as charity trips where congressmen and 
lobbyists golf and ski together to raise money for charities.  See S. Res. 158, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); 
H. Res. 250, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)..
43 See 2 U.S.C. §1604(b)(3) (requiring lobbying firms to include in their registration reports “a 
good faith estimate of the total amount of all income from the client (including any payments to the 
registrant by any other person for lobbying activities on behalf of the client)”); id. §1604(b)(4) (requiring 
that registrants engaged in lobbying activities on their own behalves include “a good faith estimate of the 
total expenses that the registrant and its employees incurred in connection with lobbying activities”).
44
“Revolving door” is a term used to describe the common phenomenon whereby congressional 
and executive staffers, and even some members of Congress and higher-level executive officials 
themselves, become lobbyists upon leaving public office.  See, e.g., Michael Wines, Powerful 
Persuaders: A Look at Lobbying Tactics – For New Lobbyists, It’s Now What They Know, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 3, 1993, at B14 (reporting that of the 121 lawmakers who left Capitol Hill after the November 1992 
election, 48 had become lobbyists within one year, as had at least 50 of their top aides and more than 30 
senior officials of the outgoing Bush I Administration).
45
 Notably, some of the nation’s top lobbyists are the relatives of current and former elected 
officials.  For example, Linda Hall Daschle, the wife of the former Senate Minority Leader and herself a 
former top official at the Federal Aviation Administration, lobbied on aviation issues while her husband 
was in office, see Jill Abramson, The Influence Industry:  The Business of Persuasion Thrives in Nation’s 
Capitol, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998, at A1; Randy DeLay, brother of former House Majority Leader Tom 
DeLay, once was as a lobbyist, id.; the son of former Louisiana Senator J. Bennett Johnston is one of 
Washington’s most successful lobbyists, and Johnston and one of his top aides joined his son in the 
business following Johnston’s retirement from Congress, id.; Michael Brown, the son of late Commerce 
Secretary Ron Brown, is a lobbyist with one of D.C.’s best known lobbying firms, Patton Boggs, see
Deirdre Shesgreen, Old, New Guard Court Williams, THE LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 7, 1998, at 4; and 
renowned Washington lobbyist Tommy Boggs is the son of the late Representative Hale Boggs, see Frank 
N. Winer, The Money Game, TRAFFIC WORLD, Oct. 26, 1998, at 21.
13
public perceives that lobbyists receive special face time with elected officials.46  Whether that 
face time occurs in scheduled meetings, on a train ride,47 over a game of poker,48 or on the golf 
course,49 it creates opportunities for lobbyists to present and persuade elected officials of their 
clients’ positions — opportunities that ordinary citizens do not have.50  In other words, the 
public’s concern is not just that elected officials will engage in blatant vote-selling to lobbyists, 
but, more subtly, that they will be susceptible or partial to the causes of lobbyists’ clients because 
they spend a lot of time in lobbyists’ company.  Public concern with the lobbying process thus 
reflects an underlying view that lobbyists have the ability — through some combination of 
monetary and personal clout — to make elected officials forego their independent judgment and 
take actions that are in the lobbyists’ clients’ best interests, as distinct from the interests of the 
46 See, e.g., Martin Tolchin, The Outlook for Lobbying: Critical Capitol is Pondering the Deaver 
Effect, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1986, at 134 (quoting Senator David L. Boren’s reports of public concern 
over the fact that some former officials earned as much as 20 times their former salaries by becoming 
lobbyists within a short time of leaving government, and that Oklahoma farmers attributed their problems 
in exporting farm products to the efforts of former officials who left government to become high-priced 
lobbyists); Michael Wines, Powerful Persuaders: A Look at Lobbying Tactics – For New Lobbyists, It’s 
Now What They Know, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1993, at B14 (referencing a Public Citizen report labeling the 
revolving-door phenomenon “government service for sale”).
47
 On the way to the 1992 Democratic convention in New York, for example, lobbyists paying 
several thousand dollars apiece were given the opportunity to ride for three hours on a train from 
Washington to New York with members of Congress.  See Charles Lewis, The Rainmaker’s in Bill’s 
Parade: Outing the Insiders, THE NATION, vol. 255, Dec. 7, 1992, at 693.
48
 Newspaper reports in 1995 outed Senator Alfonse D’Amato’s long-standing tradition of 
hosting Thursday night poker games in his office for “a small group of influential lobbyists and other 
Washington insiders”, including many who represent banks, securities firms, credit unions, and other 
financial institutions with business before D’Amato’s Banking Committee.  See, e.g., Douglas Frantz &
Jane Fritsch, High-Stakes Poker Put Lobbyists Close to D’Amato’s Ear, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1995, at 1.  
Needless to say, the games “were an extraordinary opportunity to reach a Senator whose actions are 
crucial to their clients.”  Id.
49 DeLay Foundation Exploits New Rules, ROLL CALL, Jan. 20, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 
3035720 (describing charity event in which lobbyists, business executives, and elected officials golfed 
together to raise money for abused children).
50
 In the words of Representative Frank R. Lautenberg, “[t]he meal involves time, and time means 
access.  Ordinary citizens do not have that access.”  Jonathan D. Salant & Richard Sammon, Senate Bans 
Lavish Gifts From Interest Groups, 1995 Cong. Q. 2237, 2238 (July 29, 1995).  Public Citizen Director 
Pamela Gilbert similarly testified during hearings on the 1993 LDA that, “the vast, vast majority of 
American citizens never hire anybody to be able to wine and dine a Member of Congress, so you have a 
tremendous disadvantage.  It is not a level playing field.”  See Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1993, Hearing 
on H.R. 823 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Gov’tl Relations of the House. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, [hereinafter 1993 LDA Hearing] 103d Cong., 1st Sess. at 202 (Mar. 31, 1993).
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general public.51
2.  The Gap Between the LDA and the Public’s Concerns
Viewed from the above perspective, the LDA fails even to attempt to address the public’s 
concerns in several important respects.  First, although the public’s misgivings about the 
lobbying process focus on lobbyists’ ability to command the attention of and exert influence over 
elected officials, the LDA essentially leaves elected officials out of the scope of its regulations.  
The Act requires disclosures only from lobbyists, not elected officials, and the information it 
demands of lobbyists is general and vague, telling the public nothing about the lobbyists’ 
contacts with any elected official.52  Because of disclosure requirements in the FECA and the 
BCRA, lobbyists must disclose their campaign contributions to elected officials elsewhere, but 
tying such disclosures to lobbyists’ activities on behalf of a particular client requires substantial 
cross-referencing and, in any event, reveals nothing about the amount or kind of face time that 
individual lobbyists obtain vis-à-vis elected officials to discuss issues of importance to their 
client(s).
This focus on disclosures by and about lobbyists is, from the public’s standpoint, a little 
upside-down.  After all, the social contract upon which our government is based is not between 
lobbyists and the public; it is between the public and its elected officials.  It is elected officials,53
not lobbyists, who are agents of the public, and who hold their positions and make policy at the 
public’s behest.  If the public has an interest or right to know who is exerting influence in the 
legislative game, that interest must stem from its political contract with the officials it elects and 
its desire to know how those officials are executing their political charge — i.e., the public is 
interested in lobbyists (and their clients) only to the extent that they interact with and influence 
elected officials and public policy, not in lobbyists or their clients themselves.  Particular 
lobbyists are not the starting point of the public’s concern; rather, citizens are interested in who 
their state representatives or the members of a particular congressional committee are meeting 
with, listening to, and otherwise consulting about policy decisions.  Thus, it would make far 
more sense for the LDA to require some disclosure about lobbyists’ contacts with individual 
elected officials, broken down by official, than it does for the Act to require that lobbyists 
disclose their clients and fees, and list the legislative chamber or executive department contacted 
on behalf of a client, broken down by lobbyist and/or client name.  Indeed, the LDA differs in 
this respect from its close cousins, the FECA and BCRA, which require candidates for elective 
51
 The United States Supreme Court has recognized the validity of such concerns in the related 
context of campaign finance regulation.  See FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 
U.S. 431, 441 (2001) (acknowledging that corruption of the political process extends beyond explicit 
cash-for-votes agreements and includes “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment”).  In McConnell 
v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), concerning the constitutionality of the BCRA, the Court specifically 
discussed corporate interests’ use of donations to “gain access to high-level government officials” and 
noted the “appearance” of undue influence created by such access.  540 U.S. at 150.
52 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
53
 This includes, by extension, the staff, appointees, and others whom elected officials allow to 
have input into their legislative policy decisions.
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office to make detailed disclosures about the sources of contributions to their political 
campaigns.54
Second, and related to the first, the LDA fails to address the public’s concerns about the 
purchasing of access to legislators, as distinct from the outright purchasing of votes.  Further, it
ignores the perceived disparity between the access that elected officials afford to well-connected 
lobbyists and the wealthy interests who are able to hire them, versus to ordinary members of the 
public and to less wealthy interests.  That is, the Act in no way attempts to level the playing field 
between moneyed and not-so-moneyed interests in the lobbying game.  In fact, if anything, the 
LDA seems to promote inequalities between such groups; one of its provisions, for instance, 
effectively prohibits certain non-profit organizations, known as 501(c)(4)s, from lobbying or 
hiring lobbyists by denying them federal funds if they engage in lobbying activities.55
The LDA does minimally address the revolving door problem, by placing a one-year ban 
on lobbying by former members, officers, or employees of Congress and their staff.56  But it does 
not preclude would-be revolving-door lobbyists from advising clients on lobbying strategy, or 
from letting their names be used by clients who want to gain access to a friendly bureaucratic ear 
during this one-year cooling off period.  Further, even the restrictions that the Act does impose 
last only for one year, and once that year has passed, elected officials (and their former staff 
members) can lobby the very committees and offices for which they formerly served, no matter 
how high a post they (or their former employers) once held.57 While there may be legitimate 
reasons for allowing, or even desiring, such insiders to serve as lobbyists on policy matters in 
their areas of expertise,58 the practice as currently condoned feeds the public’s visions of a small 
cadre of hired-gun lobbyists controlling public policy, on their clients’ terms, without regard for
anyone else’s interests.
Gift ban resolutions similarly address only the quid pro quo problem, but not the 
purchasing of access to elected officials:  Although they bar lobbyists from paying for officials’ 
meals or travel expenses, the resolutions cannot and do not ban elected officials from socializing 
with lobbyists — e.g., at charity golf or skiing events organized by lobbyists to benefit causes 
54 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. §434(b)(2) & (3) (disclosure requirements for 
individual candidates’ political committees); id. at §434(d),(f) & (g) (requiring disclosure by individuals 
and entities under certain circumstances).  The FECA also initially required individuals making 
contributions or expenditures exceeding $100 to file a statement with the Federal Election Commission.  
See 2 U.S.C. §432 (Supp. II 1973).
55 See 2 U.S.C. §1611 (referencing 26 U.S.C. §501(c)(4)).  Specifically, the Act provides that any 
civic league or non-profit organized for the promotion of social welfare will lose all federal grants, loans, 
or other awards if it engages in lobbying activities.
56 See 18 U.S.C. § 207(e).
57
 Former Senate Energy Committee Chairman J. Bennett Johnston became a lobbyist in 1996, as 
did one of his top aides; their client roster “brims with energy interests.”  Abramson, supra note 45, at A1.  
Ann M. Eppard, once a top aide to former House Transportation Committee chairman, Bud Shuster, 
similarly left her job in 1994 to become a transportation lobbyist.  See id.
58 See discussion infra section II.C, pp. __.
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supported by elected officials.  Nor do the gift ban resolutions forbid lobbyists from inviting 
elected officials to speak at events that they host.59  Thus, the resolutions do not eliminate 
moneyed interests’ special access to legislators; they only limit such interests’ ability to shower 
small treats and favors upon legislators.
Finally, the LDA’s weak enforcement provisions thwart the public’s underlying desire to 
hold elected officials and, perhaps to a lesser extent lobbyists and their clients, accountable for 
lobbying improprieties.  As discussed earlier, the sanctions created by the LDA apply only to 
lobbyists,60 not to the elected officials who are the focal point of the public’s concerns, or to the 
interests whom the lobbyists represent.  In addition, prosecutions under the Act are so few and 
far between61 that there is little incentive for lobbyists to make adequate disclosures even of the 
little information they are required to report.62  Further, there is no way for the public to know 
about underreporting or other violations of the Act unless the House Clerk or Secretary of the 
Senate decides to divulge this information.63  The House and Senate gift ban resolutions suffer 
from similar flaws because although the resolutions do require disclosures from elected officials 
themselves, they too are subject to lax enforcement and widespread noncompliance, as proved by 
59 See S. Res. 158.104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (amending Senate Rule XXXV; see Rule 
XXXV(1)(c)(23)(A)).
60 See 2 U.S.C. §§1605(8), 1606.
61 See, e.g., Kenneth P. Doyle, Senate Passed 2,000 Possible LDA Violations To DOJ, Dodd
Reports; DOJ Pursued 13 Cases, BNA MONEY & POLITICS REP. (Feb. 14, 2006) (recounting DOJ report 
that it has pursued possible enforcement action in only 13 lobbying-reporting-violation cases since 2003); 
Kate Ackley, LDA Enforcement: Is It Strong Enough?, ROLL CALL (June 27, 2005) available at 2005 
WLNR 10116594 (quoting comment by a spokesman for the U.S. Attorney’s Office that there have been 
“few” prosecutions related to the LDA); Carl Weiser, Enforcement of Law Almost Non-Existent, U.S.A. 
TODAY, Nov. 16, 1999, at 11A (reporting that between January 1, 1996, when the LDA took effect, and 
the date of the article in November 1999, not a single lobbyist had been prosecuted or referred for 
prosecution under the Act, and commenting that “no one knows whether lobbyists are complying with the 
law”).
62 See, e.g., Editorial, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, High Fives in the Skybox, Jan. 18, 2005, at 
8 (noting that “[e]ven lobbyists on Washington’s K street corridor have said they view the act as 
‘voluntary’”).  A recent study of lobbying disclosure forms conducted by the Center for Public Integrity 
found that 20% of such forms were filed at least three months after the deadline; in fact, 3,000 forms were 
filed six months late and 1,700 disclosure forms were at least one year overdue.  Eliza Newlin Carney, 
Lobbyists in the Crossfire, CONG. DAILY (May 16, 2005) available at 2005 WLNR 7653948.
63
 For most of the LDA’s life, the Senate Office of Public Records (“SOPR”), which oversees 
LDA enforcement on the Senate side, has refused to make public the number of its LDA-related referrals 
to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, much less to provide any details about individual cases.  See Kate Ackley, 
LDA Enforcement: Is It Strong Enough?, ROLL CALL, June 27, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 
10116594; Doyle, supra note 61, at __.   In a Senate Rules and Administration Committee meeting held 
on February 7, 2006, in the wake of the Abramoff and DeLay scandals, the SOPR for the first time 
reported that, between 2003 and early 2006, it referred over 2,000 cases of possible LDA violations to the 
Justice Department; the Justice Department responded that it has received only about 200 such referrals.
Doyle, supra note 61, at __.
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recent events.64
C. Why Congress Opted For Symbolic Reform
Why do the regulations imposed by the LDA fall so short of addressing the public’s 
concerns?  Is Congress unaware of the public’s views, or has it simply chosen to ignore them?  
This Section argues that Congress’ failure to enact lobbying regulations that more closely satisfy  
the public’s concerns is the result of a confluence of factors: congressional sensitivity to 
constitutional constraints involving the First Amendment, substantial differences in 
congressional versus public perceptions of lobbying, and self-interested legislator behavior.
1. First Amendment Concerns
First Amendment concerns are the reason that Congress itself typically gives in 
explaining why the LDA is structured as a disclosure statute, rather than a conduct-regulating 
statute, and why it lacks strong enforcement mechanisms.65  Irrespective of what the public 
might want, Congress understands — and to some extent hides behind — the fact that it cannot 
prohibit, or even substantially restrict, substantive lobbying practices without violating citizens’
64 See, e.g., Mary Curtius & Chuck Neubauer, DeLay Reports He Made Five Trips Within U.S. in 
2004, L.A. TIMES (Bus. Sec.), June 16, 2005 (reporting that in the wake of the DeLay scandal, other 
House members and staff members began filing a flurry of reports about trips they previously had failed 
to disclose); Lobby Control, ROLL CALL, June 8, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 9072447 (reporting that 
to date, members of Congress “have ignored [the LDA’s] report-filing requirements and, under scrutiny, 
are now scrambling to fulfill their obligations” and noting that Republicans’ response to criticism of 
DeLay’s travel practices was in effect, that “everybody does it”).
65 See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. H1703, 1704 (Sept. 6, 1995) (extension of Remarks by Rep. Lee H. 
Hamilton) (“Lobbying reform is needed, but it must be balanced. We must not reach too far and try to 
restrict legitimate lobbying activities and public contact with Members of Congress. Almost any attempt 
by the government to limit private and nongovernmental entities from using their own private funds to 
lobby will be difficult due to the First Amendment.”); 1993 LDA Hearing, supra note 50, at 1 (Opening 
Statement of Committee Chairman John Bryant, commenting that the 1993 LDA “is designed to provide 
for the effective disclosure of the efforts of paid lobbyists to influence Federal, legislative, or executive 
branch officials in the conduct of government actions so that the public can see what influences these 
important actions affecting their lives while continuing to afford the fullest opportunity to the people to 
exercise their right to petition their Government for a redress of grievances and to express their opinions 
freely and provide information to the Government”).  See also Robert L. Koenig, Senator Offers 
Legislation to Close Lobbying Loopholes, ST. LOUIS POST- DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 1992,  at 16A (reporting 
comments by Senator Carl Levin that lobbying is protected by the First Amendment and that “[t]he way 
to protect the public interest is through disclosure”).
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First Amendment rights of petition, speech, and association.66  First Amendment concerns are, 
for example, behind the Act’s failure to place caps on the dollar amounts that a group may spend 
for lobbying activities67 or to restrict campaign contributions by those who engage in lobbying
activities.68  They also explain the weakness of the penalties imposed for non-compliance with 
the LDA’s disclosure requirements: The previous lobbying regulation statute, the 1946 Federal 
Regulation of Lobbying Act (“FRLA”), had imposed criminal penalties and prohibited future 
lobbying by those found to have violated its provisions, and these penalties widely had been 
66
 First Amendment issues raised by lobbying regulations are discussed more fully infra Section 
III.C.2.  In brief, the concern is that “the First Amendment protects [the] right not only to advocate [one’s] 
cause, but also to select what [one] believe[s] to be the most effective means of doing so,” including 
hiring a lobbyist.  Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988); see also Lehnert, et. al. v. Ferris Faculty 
Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 522 (199 1) (First Amendment freedom of expression protects the decision whether 
to engage in or hire someone to engage in political lobbying).  Legislative restrictions on political 
advocacy or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation thus violate the First Amendment, whether 
those restrictions are placed directly on those who seek to benefit from the passage or defeat of legislation 
or on those who are hired to advocate on others’ behalves.  Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976).  
Even disclosure requirements can run afoul of the First Amendment if their effect is to chill citizens’ 
exercise of their right to advocate or of their right to associate for fear that public exposure of their 
affiliation with a particular position or interest group might result in adverse economic or private 
consequences.  See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982); Baird v. 
State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971).  For detailed treatments of how lobbying is protected under the 
First Amendment see David E. Landau, Public Disclosure of Lobbying: Congress and Associational 
Privacy After Buckley v. Valeo, 22 HOW. L. J. 27 (1979 ); Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on 
Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional Right to Lobby, 16 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 149 (1993); 
Steven A. Browne, Note, The Constitutionality of Lobby Reform: Implicating Associational Privacy and 
the Right to Petition the Government, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 717 (1995).
67 [Cite]. 
68
 The Senate in 1992 considered enacting a law that would have prohibited lobbyists from 
making political contributions to any candidate or elected official whom they had lobbied within the past 
year, but the bill died amidst serious concern that it would violate the First Amendment.  See, e.g., 139 
CONG. REC. S6655, S6657 (May 27, 1993) (Statement of Senator Paul Wellstone questioning 
constitutionality of the proposed law).
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criticized as constitutionally suspect.69  In addition, First Amendment arguments formed the 
focal point of interest group opposition to proposed LDA provisions that would have required
disclosure of grassroots lobbying activities. 70
But First Amendment concerns do not explain why the LDA leaves Congress out of the 
lobbying equation, focusing all of its disclosure requirements exclusively on lobbyists.  Nor do 
they explain the Act’s failure to address the public’s concerns about lobbyist access to elected 
officials.  To understand these, it is necessary to consider the dynamics of the legislative process, 
and the role of lobbying therein.
69
 The 1946 Act contained a provision that made violations of the Act a misdemeanor, punishable 
by a fine of $5,000 or imprisonment of up to 12 months, and that prohibited persons who were convicted 
of violating the Act from engaging in lobbying activities for a subsequent period of three years.  See 2 
U.S.C. §269(a) & (b).  The District Court for the District of Columbia found this provision to be 
“obviously unconstitutional” on the ground that a person convicted of a crime cannot for that reason be 
stripped of his constitutional privileges, including the right to petition the government.  See Nat’l Ass’n of 
Mfrs. v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 510, 514 (D.D.C. 1952), vacated by McGrath v. National Ass'n of Mfrs 
of U S, 344 U.S. 804 (1952).  Although the Supreme Court later vacated this ruling and found the 1946 
FRLA constitutionally valid, it left for another day the question of whether the Act’s penalty provisions 
were constitutional.  See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 627 (1954).  Most scholars and 
commentators continue to view such sanctions as unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Ronald 
M. Levin & Theodore Ruger, Constitutional Issues Raised by the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act, in THE 
LOBBYING MANUAL: A COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND LOBBYISTS (William V. Luneburg & 
Thomas M. Susman, eds. 2005) at 149 (calling the sanction “highly questionable” and applauding 
Congress for abandoning its use in the 1995 LDA).
70 See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S14207, S14208 (Oct. 5, 1994) (statements of Sen. Dole) (discussing 
request by certain members of Congress to remove grassroots regulations from conference report for 1993 
LDA because of “wide” and “diverse” interest group concern that the Act’s grassroots lobbying 
provisions “will seriously impair our ability to exercise our rights guaranteed under the First 
Amendment”); 140 CONG. REC. H10283, 10291 (Sept. 29, 1994) (statements of Representative Doolittle 
criticizing grassroots lobbying provisions as a “gag rule” that “will have a chilling effect on free 
expression” and citing diverse list of grassroots groups opposed to the legislation, including the ACLU, 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Defenders of Property Rights, and the Christian Coalition).  The concerns 
expressed were that regulation of grassroots lobbying would result in the disclosure of interest groups’ 
membership lists and possibly chill the political participation of religious organizations.  See, e.g., 141 
CONG. REC. S10654, S10654 (July 25, 1995) (statement of Senator Smith discussing concern that prior 
version of bill containing grassroots lobbying provision threatened to “make grassroots lobbyists divulge 
their entire mailing lists”); Jonathan D. Salant, House Postpones Vote On Tougher Rules, 1995 Cong. Q. 
3589 (Nov. 25, 1995) (noting that Republicans had opposed the LDA in the prior year because they 
believed it “could limit the political participation of religious organizations by forcing them to disclose 
their grass-roots lobbying efforts”).  Because of the vociferous opposition to such regulation, the final 
version of the LDA passed in 1995 contains no regulation of grassroots lobbying.  See 141 CONG. REC.
H13099, H13103 (Nov. 16, 1995) (statement of Representative John Bryant) (presenting 1995 LDA for 
consideration and noting that prior year’s “controversial” grassroots lobbying provision was not in current 
bill); 141 CONG. REC. S15513, S15514 (Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of bill sponsor Sen. Levin explaining 
that “[w]e struck any reference to grassroots lobbying from the lobbying reform bill this year in order to 
make progress”).
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2. Differences in Congressional v. Public Perceptions About Lobbying
One overlooked, but key, reason for the disjunct between public concerns about lobbying 
and the LDA’s actual provisions is that Congress’ conception of lobbyists and their role in the 
legislative process differs vastly from the public’s.  Whereas the public views lobbyists as soul-
less mercenaries, skilled at arm-twisting and bribing legislators into appeasing their clients’ 
interests at the expense of the public good,71 Congress (generally) views lobbyists as invaluable 
policy experts who provide elected officials with useful information about the underlying
subjects of proposed legislation.72  Broadly speaking, the public seems to have adopted a 
“pluralist”73 view of the lobbying process, in which interest groups — through their hired 
lobbyists — barter in the political marketplace to obtain the best possible package of goods and 
services for themselves, with little thought for the broader public interest.74  Congress, by 
contrast, seems to subscribe to a “deliberative” model of the legislative process75 in which 
lobbyists, motivated by their clients’ best interests, present specialized information to elected 
officials, who take that information into account when debating various policy proposals and 
71 See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Lobbyist Disclosure Is Backed in Senate: Gift Issue Is Put Off, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 1995, at 1 (quoting comment by Senator Cohen indicating that a perception had 
developed “that just a few key people are being paid very high dollars in order to shape and influence and 
alter public policy in ways that are very damaging to the overall good of the country”).
72 See, e.g., 1993 LDA Hearing, supra note 50, at 127 (statement by Representative Frank) 
(commenting that he finds lobbyists to be “very useful sources of information”); Clymer, supra note 71, 
at 1 (reporting that Senator Cohen defended lobbyists as providing an important democratic service); 
David E. Shribman, Lobbying: Business by Nuance, Feint and Gamble, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1981, at 
111 (quoting comment by Rep. LaFalce, D-NY, that legislators “almost by definition, have to be 
generalists, but we also have to deal with very technical issues requiring the skills of specialists” and that 
lobbyists providing useful such specialized information); David E. Shribman, Lobbyists Proliferate - So 
Do the Headaches, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1982, at 45 (reporting that members of Congress admit they 
depend upon lobbyists to brief them on issues, and that with the work of Congress reaching into 
increasingly technical areas, individual members often feel they are unable to sort out issues without 
lobbyists).
73 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 32-33 
(1985) (explaining that under the pluralist view of politics, the legislative process consists of competition 
between various self-interested groups for scarce social resources).
74 See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Lobbyist Disclosure Is Backed in Senate: Gift Issue Is Put Off, N.Y. 
Times, July 25, 1995, at 1 (quoting comment by Senator Levin that public opinion polls show that “a 
majority of Americans feel that lobbyists are the real power in Washington, only 22 percent believe it’s 
Congress, and only 7 percent the President”); David E. Rosenbaum, Senate Refuses to Weaken Bill to 
Limit Gifts from Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1994, at A1 (referencing a 1992 New York Times/CBS 
News poll finding that 75 percent of American adults believed the government was run by a few big 
interests, while only 19 percent thought it was run for the benefit of all the people).
75 See id. at 41 (describing civic republicanism, or deliberative, concept of representative 
government as one in which elected officials engage in a careful process of information-gathering, 
discussion, and debate, from which a common good ultimately emerges).
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then come to their own conclusions about how best to serve the public good.76
Congress is aware of the public’s opinions and concerns about the lobbying process, but 
it considers these opinions to be uninformed and misguided.77  Elected officials, for instance, 
firmly (and sometimes vexedly) reject the popular notion that lobbyists direct or control their 
policy decisions.78  Similarly, the revolving door that is so reviled by the public does not seem 
such a bad thing to members of Congress, because it means that elected officials and government 
employees who have developed  expertise in a particular policy area can continue to share their 
76 See, e.g., Lobbyists Praised by Bono for Their Efforts to Educate Congress, 
COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Feb. 22, 1996, available at 1996 WLNR 3292400 [hereinafter Lobbyists 
Praised] (quoting Rep. Bono’s observations that “‘education by lobbyists’ is very valuable to Congress 
and after lobbyists have done their work, ‘ethics take over’ when members decide how to vote on 
issues”); Shribman, supra note 72, at 111 (quoting comment by Rep. Henry A. Waxman that “[l]obbyists 
help us see the full impact of legislation we might adopt” but indicating that he knows to be “sensitive to 
the fact that they often think their self-interest and the public interest are the same thing”); id. (quoting
explanation by Rep. LaFalce that “[w]e often have to turn to lobbyists for information” but that he knows 
how to “use lobbyists rather than have the lobbyists use [him]” and how to “get the perspective of 
lobbyists who differ with each other”); Shribman, supra note 72, at 45 (reporting, based on interviews 
with members of Congress, that legislators “listen to lobbyists representing more than one side of an issue 
and proceed to make their decisions”).
77 See, e.g., 1993 LDA Hearing, supra note 50, at 126-27 (statement by Rep. Frank) (“People who 
think that adopting the most stringent forms of regulation and disclosure will materially change the public 
policy of this country are wrong.  I think there is a misperception that public policy is shifted more by this 
than, in fact, is the case.”); Rosenbaum, supra note 74, at A1 (reporting that senators had said they “knew 
they were honorable public servants and that they should stop beating up on themselves to vanquish a 
misguided public perception” that their votes could be bought).  See also Michael Wines, House Hardens 
Rule on Lobbyists; Bans Accepting Gifts From Them, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1994, at A1 (reporting 
legislator comments on the House floor indicating that they had been wounded “by the mistaken 
perception that they can be swayed by free skiing vacations, tickets to National Football League games 
and dinners in four-star restaurants”).
78 See, e.g., Lobbyists Praised, supra note 76 (quoting Rep. Bono’s comment that although 
lobbyists help educate members of Congress, members make their own independent decisions about how 
to vote on legislation); 1993 LDA Hearing, supra note 50 at 196 (statements of Rep. John Bryant) (“What 
I am concerned about, though, is the impression that is constantly given is that members are induced to 
make different decisions after the have been elected and come here simply because somebody is taking 
the to dinner or spending funds on them. . . .  “I really thing it is wrong of you and wrong of anyone to 
suggest that this place changes its mind because of things like that”); LESTER MILBRATH, THE 
WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS 352 (Rand McNally & Co., 1962) (congressional respondents in a study 
reported that other factors are more important in shaping policy outcomes than is lobbying); S. REP. NO.
1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1946) (Senate Judiciary Committee report disdainfully referencing those 
who come to Washington “under the false impression that they exert some mysterious influence over 
Members of Congress”).
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knowledge with Congress even after they have left government service.79  In fact, members of 
Congress have been known to rely on lobbyists, revolving-door and otherwise, for help in 
writing speeches and even drafting parts of legislation.80  Thus, in enacting the LDA, Congress 
neither wanted nor saw a need to change many aspects of the lobbying process that troubled the 
public and, accordingly, tended to focus on superficially appeasing, rather than substantively 
addressing, the public’s concerns when constructing lobbying regulations.  That is, Congress 
wanted to enact lobbying regulation in order to repair its image with the, in its view, 
misinformed public — but it wanted to do so without substantially changing the way that 
lobbying is practiced.  This explains why, for example, Congress drafted the LDA to impose a 
one-year ban on revolving-door lobbying, rather than banning such lobbying outright, as the 
public might have preferred,81 and why legislators, in drafting the House and Senate gift ban 
resolutions, themselves commented that these reforms were designed to address the public’s 
misconceptions but were unlikely to effect real change in the lobbying process.82
Congress does have its own concerns about the lobbying process, but its concerns differ 
substantially from those expressed by the public.  Unsurprisingly, the primary congressional 
concern is with protecting members of Congress from harassment by lobbyists.  As then-Senator 
John F. Kennedy once wrote, “the problem is pressure on the legislative branch of the 
Government.”83  In Congress’ view, although some lobbyists can be valuable information 
sources, the sheer number and ubiquity of lobbyists can make interacting with them exacting and 
79 See, e.g., Martin Tolchin, Senators at Hearing Support a Bill to Tighten Lobbyist Restrictions, 
N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 1986, at A32 (quoting comment by David H. Martin, director of the Office of 
Government Ethics, that “We do not want to prevent a person from using his expertise and his knowledge 
when he leaves the government”).
80 See Congress and Pressure Groups, supra note 1, at 18 (quoting lobbyist Charles Walker’s 
descriptions of last-minute phone calls from legislators asking for speech-writing help); Wines, supra
note 77, at B14 (noting that revolving-door lobbyist Jan Schoonmaker has twice helped House 
appropriators write legislative language).
81
 Similarly, nothing in the LDA prevents former members of Congress from lobbying executive-
branch agencies that they once supervised as committee members. The same is true of former executive-
branch officials, who can lobby Congress unbridled.
82 See, e.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 74, at A1 (quoting Senator Johnston’s comment that “[t]he 
assumption is that if we pass this bill, somehow it will satisfy the American public who has unjustly 
believed that we can be bought for a sack of fruit”); Wines, supra note 77, at A1 (noting that 
Representative John Bryant “and many other lawmakers” said their behavior would not change because 
they do not socialize with lobbyists nearly as much as the public believes).  See also Adam Clymer, 
G.O.P. Filibuster Deals a Setback to Lobbying Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1994, at A1 (quoting comment 
by then-Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole that, “We’re prepared to correct all the abuses, real or 
perceived, that have tarnished the credibility of Congress”) (emphasis added); Wines, supra note 77, at 
A1 (quoting comment by lobbyist Allen Klein that “[The House gift resolution]’s going to have a positive 
effect on the public perception, but it’s going to have a very limited effect on the way business is done 
here”).
83
 John F. Kennedy, Congressional Lobbies: A Chronic Problem Re-Examined, 45 GEORGETOWN 
L. J. 535, 556 (1957).
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confusing for elected officials.  Thus, the aim of lobbying regulation, from Congress’ 
perspective, is to help level the playing field between lobbyists, who hold all of the information, 
and elected officials, who hold none — by, for example, forcing lobbyists to identify the interests 
on whose behalf they are advocating so that elected officials will know who is behind the data 
(and pressure) that they are receiving.84
House and Senate reports studying the lobbying process also reveal a congressional 
concern about the unequal access obtained by big business versus less affluent interests.  A 
House Select Committee Report on Lobbying published in 1950, for example, acknowledged 
that “the advantage in lobbying would always lie with those interests which [are] best organized, 
best financed, and had the easiest access to mass media of communication” and that, for this 
reason, “[o]rganized business has always gained the most from lobbying.”85  The problem with 
this disparity is that it skews the spectrum of information presented to legislators and, therefore, 
the shape of public policy.  As Congress has recognized, “[f]acts are seldom presented for their 
own sake, or without having been carefully selected for maximum impact” and it is only “where 
a full hearing is available for all interested groups” that Congress can “rely on competitive 
watchfulness and public scrutiny as partial safeguards against misrepresentation of the facts by 
any one group.”86  But, concluding that it had no feasible way to remedy this situation, Congress 
essentially abandoned this concern when contemplating the shape of lobbying regulation and 
focused instead on obtaining more information from lobbyists.87
Thus, whereas the public views lobbyists as dangerous influence peddlers who create 
deleterious effects in the policymaking process, Congress views them as useful, if sometimes 
annoying, political actors without whom the political system could not function.88  Given these 
divergent underlying assumptions, the goals that Congress seeks to accomplish through lobbying 
regulations differ substantially from the public’s ideal.  Factor in Congress’ dismissiveness of the 
public’s “misinformed” views, tempered by its electoral obligation to address the public’s 
concerns, and symbolic legislation is the unsurprising result.
84 See id. at 566; HOUSE REP. NO. 3138, General Interim Report, House Select Comm. on 
Lobbying Activities, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. at 30 (1950) [hereinafter 1950 House Report] (“The all-
pervading purpose and intent of the Lobbying Act was to bring into the open activities intended to 
influence legislation, directly and indirectly, and to provide full public disclosure of the financing and 
expenditures involved in these activities.”); [Preamble to 1946 Act, and perhaps other proposed bills?].
85 1950 House Report, supra note 84, at 63.
86 Id. at 27.
87 Id. at 66 (rejecting proposals for leveling playing field between wealthy and less wealthy 
interests and stating that “We need more information on lobbying and lobbyists.  This, at the moment, is 
the most feasible approach.  Every group has the right to present its case, but at the same time Congress 
and the public have a right to know who they are, what they are doing, how much they are spending, and 
where the money is coming from. . . .  What is needed is that this act be equipped to fulfill more 
effectively the purposes for which it was designed.”).  
88 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 83, at 566 (calling lobbyists the “third chamber” and praising 
the “real contribution they make to the legislative process”).
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3. Legislator Self-Interest
Beyond philosophical differences in congressional versus public perceptions of lobbying, 
legislator self-interestedness also seems to have played a significant role in shaping the symbolic 
LDA.  Basic game theory tells us that legislators can be expected to maximize their own self-
interest when enacting lobbying regulations, and this is precisely what seems to have occurred 
with the LDA.  First, despite their central role in the lobbying process, legislators distanced 
themselves from the LDA’s regulatory burdens, instead placing the entire onus of the Act’s 
disclosure requirements on lobbyists.  Second, despite the public’s deep distrust of lobbying
practices, legislators constructed the LDA in a manner that leaves lobbyist contacts with elected 
officials both unregulated and undisclosed, thereby protecting their own ability to obtain the 
benefit of lobbyists’ expertise, information, and assistance in drafting speeches and legislation —
without the public’s knowledge.  Further, legislators imposed only the most minimal of 
revolving-door restrictions upon themselves, requiring former members of Congress and their 
committee staff to wait only one year before lobbying (and providing information and legislative 
assistance to) members of the committees on which they once served.
II. BEYOND SYMBOLISM: THE PROMISE OF MORE RESPONSIVE LOBBYING REFORM
A. Is Symbolism Enough? 
Given legislators’ incentives, one might wonder whether symbolism might not be the 
most that we can expect from Congress in the context of lobbying regulation.  Indeed, symbolism 
has much to recommend it:  Congress certainly is correct in its view that the public lacks an 
accurate understanding of the beneficial role lobbyists can play in the legislative process, and 
symbolism allows Congress to satisfy the public’s concerns superficially, as well as to correct its 
own informational disadvantages vis-à-vis lobbyists, without disrupting those aspects of the 
lobbying process that it believes work well.  Moreover, disclosure — an inherently symbolic 
form of regulation — may be the only method of lobbying regulation permitted by the First 
Amendment.
But while there is nothing wrong with symbolism per se, the LDA’s approach to lobbying 
regulation — an approach that has been accepted without question by those who seek to reform 
the lobbying process — leaves something to be desired.  First, the Act’s approach discounts the 
public’s concern with lobbyist access to elected officials, focusing almost exclusively on the 
financial aspects of lobbyists’ activities.89  As a result, the disclosures that current regulations 
produce are incomplete and provide no information with which to gauge any correlation between 
lobbyists’ and interest groups’ monetary contributions and their legislative access.  In this 
respect, the LDA falls far short of achieving its own symbolic goals of increasing public 
89
 Significantly, lobbyists themselves confirm the public’s concerns, stating that their objective is 
to ensure access to policy makers and that they make contributions to help them gain access, not to buy 
the votes of elected officials.  See, e.g., Evans, supra note 26, at 267.  While this statement should, of 
course, be taken with a grain of salt given its self-serving nature, it undoubtedly describes at least some 
lobbyists’ behavior.
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awareness about the lobbying process and of improving public confidence in the integrity of 
government.
Second, the LDA’s lax enforcement provisions leave substantial room for lobbyists to 
circumvent its disclosure requirements through incomplete, intentionally vague, and even 
egregiously late filings.  Further, they enable lobbyists and interest groups, working together, to 
avoid full disclosure, by registering an affiliate or coalition name rather than a recognizable 
interest group name under the “client” category — with little fear of detection, let alone 
sanction.90
Third, even if the LDA’s disclosure requirements had been sufficient to satisfy the 
public’s needs when enacted, Congress’ passage of the BCRA in 2002 at least arguably made 
more aggressive lobbying disclosure necessary.  In restricting interest groups’ ability to make 
campaign contributions, BCRA closed off one prominent tactic used by interest groups to obtain
political access to elected officials.91  Because money is fungible, cutting off its use in one 
political arena inevitably will lead to increased expenditures in another;92 thus, if the law limits 
how much interests can spend on campaigns, interests presumably will begin to spend more on 
other political activities, including lobbying.93  This, in turn, means that the political stakes 
associated with lobbying will increase and that lobbying likely will play an increasingly 
significant role in the legislative process.
Ultimately, the problem with the LDA’s approach is not merely that it is symbolic, but 
that it offers only a narrow, static solution to a dynamic problem.  The Act’s approach assumes 
that requiring minimal disclosures about lobbyists’ clients, fees, and issue areas automatically 
will result in greater public respect for the lobbying system, and ignores the manner in which 
different political players interact with each other in the lobbying process, as well as the manner 
90
 This problem is discussed in greater detail infra Section IV.B.2.
91
 Before BCRA, interest groups could circumvent legal caps on contributions to political 
candidates by donating unlimited amounts to political parties, who in turn passed this money on to their 
candidates.  See, e.g.,  Note, Soft Money: The Current Rules and the Case for Reform, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1323 (1998).  BCRA makes such “soft money” – i.e., money not subject to a contribution cap –
contributions unavailable to political parties and, thereby, political candidates, by subjecting all political 
party expenditures to contribution limits.  See 2 U.S.C. §434; see also de Figueiredo & Garrett, supra note 
40, at 598-99.
92
 For an excellent discussion of this hydraulics principle, see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. 
Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1714, 1709 (1999) (noting, 
for example, that “campaign money is inevitably seeking the path of least resistance”).
93 Cf.  Jeffrey Milyo, Bribes and Fruit Baskets: What Does the Link Between PAC Contributions 
and Lobbying Mean?, 4 BUS. & POLITICS 157, 158-59 (2002) (noting that expenditures on lobbying and 
PAC contributions tend to move in tandem and arguing that there is strong empirical support indicating 
that PAC contributions, like lobbying, are used to gain access to elected officials) (citing Steven 
Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, and Micky Tripathi, Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked?  New 
Evidence from the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act, 4 BUS. & POLITICS 135-55 (2002)).
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in which the public obtains and processes political information.  In order to achieve more 
effective lobbying reform, we need a disclosure system that appreciates the incentives that 
motivate different political entities — legislators, interest groups, lobbyists, the media, and the 
public — and that accounts for how these entities interact with each other.  We need a system 
that produces disclosures relevant to the public, ensures the accuracy of these disclosures, and 
channels such disclosures to the public in an accessible way so that voters can make more 
informed electoral decisions and hold their elected officials accountable for their legislative and 
lobbying behavior. Such a dynamic system of lobbying regulation could benefit the public and 
the legislative process in a number of ways, beginning with increased voter competence and 
more informed (balanced) legislating.
B. Voter Competence
Voter competence is a crucial component of any democratic government that claims to be 
run based on the consent of the governed.  Voting is, of course, the only form of control that most 
citizens can exercise over those who make public policy decisions with often far- reaching private 
consequences.  It stands to reason that if voting is conducted based on inadequate or inaccurate 
information, then voters will not get the government they expect (or will not expect the 
government that they get), and that public confidence in the political p rocess accordingly will 
disintegrate.  Hence, disclosure statutes are justified in part on the theory that they provide useful 
information to citizens and legitimize the political process, as illustrated by the preamble to the 
LDA94 and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the campaign finance context.95  But if this is 
their purpose, then the information elicited by disclosure statutes should be that which is most 
helpful to citizens in deciding how to vote.96
As Elizabeth Garrett and Daniel Smith have noted in the context of campaign finance 
regulation, political scientists define voters as competent “if they cast the same votes they would 
have cast had they possessed all available knowledge about the policy consequences of their 
94 See 2 U.S.C. §1601 (listing congressional findings that “(1) responsible representative 
Government requires public awareness of the efforts of paid lobbyists to influence the public 
decisionmaking process” and “(3) the effective public disclosure of the identity and extent of the efforts of 
paid lobbyists to influence Federal officials in the conduct of Government actions will increase public 
confidence in the integrity of Government”).
95 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (citing, inter alia, state interest in “providing 
the electorate with information” as justification for BCRA’s application of disclosure requirements to all 
“electioneering communications”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976) ( citing governmental 
interests “in providing the electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from 
and how it is spent by the candidate” and “in deterring actual corruption and avoiding the appearance of 
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity” as sufficient to 
justify intrusion on First Amendment rights by FECA’s disclosure requirements).
96 See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors: The Real Threat to Campaign 
Disclosure Statutes (USC-Caltech Ctr. for the Study of Law and Politics, Working Paper No. 13, 2002), 
available at http:// lawweb.usc.edu/cslp/papers/cslp-wp-013.pdf.
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decision.”97  That is, if knowledge of Candidate X’s position on 100 political issues would render 
a voter competent in an election, then if Citizen A does not know these facts, and cannot access 
other facts that allow her to make the same choice at the ballot box, she cannot vote 
competently.98  But, on the other hand, if there exists another, related, set of facts that leads her 
to make the same choice she would have made with knowledge of Candidate X’s position on 100 
political issues — e.g., the related fact that Candidate X is endorsed by the NRA — then 
knowledge of the full set of facts is not necessary to cast a competent vote.99  In other words, 
voters need not possess all available information about a candidate in order to vote competently; 
they can instead rely on “particular pieces of information, connected non-accidentally to accurate 
conclusions about the consequences of [their] vote[s],” and still make competent electoral 
decisions.100  Smaller, digestible, “particular pieces of information” thus serve as cues, or 
heuristics, that enable citizens to vote competently with limited information.101
As the use of the NRA in the above example suggests, an incumbent’s or challenger’s (if 
the challenger has held prior elective office) connection to a particular interest group can serve as 
one important heuristic for voters.102  In fact, the Supreme Court has acknowledged as much 
when discussing the value of campaign finance rules requiring disclosure of the names of those 
who have contributed to a candidate’s campaign:
[D]isclosure provides the electorate with information as to ‘where political 
97 Id. at __ (quoting Elisabeth R. Gerber & Arthur Lupia, Voter Competence in Direct Legislation 
Elections, in CITIZEN COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 147, 149 (S.L. Elkin & K.E. Soltan 
eds., 1999)).
98 Id. at __ (quoting Arthur Lupia & Richard Johnston, Are Voters to Blame?  Voter Competence 
and Elite Maneuvers in Referendums, in REFERENDUM DEMOCRACY: CITIZENS, ELITES, AND 
DELIBERATION IN REFERENDUM CAMPAIGNS 191, 194-95 (M. Mendelsohn & A. Parkin Eds., 2001)).
99 Id. (employing this example with the Sierra Club in place of the NRA).
100 Id. at __. 
101 See id. at __; Michael Kang, Democratizing Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence in 
Direct Democracy: Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 U.C.L.A L. REV. 1141 (2003) (arguing 
that strengthening heuristic cues in direct democracy is the best means for rehabilitating voter 
competence).
102 Cf. Arthur Lupia, Dumber than Chimps?  An Assessment of Direct Democracy Voters, in
DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 66, 69 (L.J. Sabato, 
H.R. Ernst & B. A. Larson eds., 2001) (listing “interest-group endorsements”, along with personal 
reputations and political ideologies, as an example of an informational shortcut that voters may use to 
help themselves make electoral decisions in ballot initiative context); Kang, supra note 101, at 1157 
(citing ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX:  INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE 
PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION 18 (1999) (for the proposition that the political orientation of many 
interest groups is well-known)); Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias:  Information and Voting 
Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 71 (1994) (finding that 
voters who were ignorant about the substantive content of insurance-related ballot initiatives, but knew 
the interest group positions, voted almost exactly like substantively knowledgeable voters).
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campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate’ in order to aid 
the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office.  It allows voters to place 
each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible 
solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches.  The sources of a 
candidate’s financial support also alert the voter to the interests to which a 
candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future 
performance in office.103
In other words, knowledge of which interest groups an elected official is most likely to pay 
attention to once in office can be a crucial factor in increasing voter competence.  The most 
reliable predictor of such future behavior, of course, is a catalogue of those interests to which the 
candidate has responded in the past — i.e., a list of his or her lobbying contacts while in office 
thus far.
Meaningful, dynamic, lobbying regulation thus must require some disclosure of elected 
officials’ (and their staffs’) 104 lobbying contacts with particular interest groups, so that the public 
can use this information to predict, reward, or punish its elected representatives’ behavior.  In 
order to prove useful to the public, moreover, lobbying regulations must ensure that the 
information disclosed (1) is accurate; and (2) is presented in a form that is both easily accessible 
to the public and likely to garner the public’s attention.  The accuracy of information about
lobbying contacts obviously is crucial, as incorrect or incomplete cues about the interests to 
which an elected official responds could lead the public to draw erroneous conclusions about 
how to vote.  As discussed earlier,105 current lobbying regulations do nothing to ensure the 
accuracy or thoroughness of lobbyist disclosures, giving the Secretary of the Senate and the 
Clerk of the House no authority to investigate whether the information reported by lobbyists is 
103
 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976) (emphasis added).
104
 In order to obtain an accurate picture of lobbyists’ access and opportunities to influence 
elected officials, it is imperative that contacts with members of an elected official’s staff be covered by 
disclosure requirements.  See, e.g., Evans, supra note 26, at 266 (explaining that the majority of the 
lobbyists interviewed in her study of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee “considered 
lobbying staff a key part of their strategy” and opining that such meetings were at least as fundamental to 
an interest group’s success as were meetings with the chairmen and ranking members of the House 
committee and subcommittee themselves); E-mail from Bill Dauster, Democratic General Counsel, 
United States Senate Finance Committee (Aug. 23, 2005, 07:54 EST) (on file with the author) [Also cite 
conversation with W.M., lobbyist?].
105 See discussion supra Section II.B, pp. 29-30 and accompanying notes.
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true or to catch entities who engage in lobbying activities but fail to register.106  This structure 
actually encourages incomplete and inaccurate reporting by lobbyists.107  Lobbying reforms that 
strengthen the LDA’s enforcement mechanisms and give real investigative authority to those 
charged with enforcing the Act can change this unfortunate dynamic,108 increasing lobbyists’ 
incentives to provide thorough and reliable information, and thus helping to improve the 
accuracy of voting cues.  Reforms that enable enforcers and the public to cross-reference 
information disclosed under the Act — by, for example, comparing lobbyists’ disclosures about 
their contacts with elected officials (and officials’ staff) against disclosures made by elected 
officials and staff members themselves109 — also would enhance the reliability of the 
information provided to the voting public.
In addition, the format of information disclosed under the LDA is integral to its 
usefulness as a voting heuristic.  Most voters are disengaged from politics and have little time or 
attention to devote to digesting information disclosed by lobbyists; thus it is imperative that 
lobbying regulations be designed to provide voters with “the information most crucial to 
improving their ability to vote consistently with their preferences,”110 and to do so in a format 
that readily translates into a voting cue.  Current lobbying regulations provide information in a 
decidedly non-voter-friendly manner:  The disclosures required by the LDA offer no connection 
between lobbyists’ activities and the officials whom voters have elected, and the registration 
forms available online are searchable only by lobbyist name, client name, year filed, or federal 
agency / congressional committee contacted (though, as indicated above, lobbyists rarely list the 
names of the committees they have contacted).  Lobbying reforms could ameliorate this problem 
in a number of ways.  First, they could require disclosure of lobbyist contacts with elected 
officials and their staffs on behalf of specific interests, thereby giving voters inf ormation that 
enhances their capacity to evaluate elected officials’ conduct in office and increasing their ability 
to vote consistently with their preferences.  Second, reforms to the LDA could require 
maintenance of online databases with better search and indexing capabilities, to ensure that 
voters have easier access to the information that concerns them most.
106
 The LDA does give the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House authority to 
“review, and, where necessary, verify and inquire to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of 
registration and reports,” see 2 U.S.C. §1605(2), but that authority is different from, and falls short of, 
conferring power to audit or investigate the information that lobbyists submit.  See, e.g., Weiser, supra
note __, at 11A (quoting comments by Pam Gavin, superintendent of the Senate office that collects 
lobbying forms indicating that “We do not have the authority to investigate. . . .  We only have the 
authority to inquire” and noting that while House and Senate officials have power to write to lobbyists 
asking for more information and to notify the U.S. Attorney’s office if a lobbyists is not complying, they 
would “never know” if someone is lobbying but not reporting).
107 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
108 See proposal discussed infra Section III.B., pp.__.
109 See proposal infra Section III.B.1, advocating that elected officials be required to file 
disclosure statements estimating the amount of time spent meeting with specific lobbyists on behalf of 
specific interests.
110
 Garrett & Smith, supra note 96, at __.
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Interestingly, reforms requiring disclosure of the lobbyists and interest groups who 
receive access to specific elected officials may even increase voter respect for some elected 
officials by demonstrating that these officials do, in fact, exercise independent judgment in 
making policy decisions.  Such might be the case if, for example, lobbying disclosures reveal 
that an official or his aides met with a particular group often but the official nevertheless voted 
against that group’s legislative interests, or by revealing that an official or his aides met with 
groups on both sides of an issue before deciding how to vote.111
C. More Informed Legislating
As members of Congress have acknowledged,112 lobbyists and the interests they represent 
play an important role in informing and educating elected officials about the need for, and the 
effects of, specific policy decisions.  But the information that officials receive is only as good as 
its source.  No one doubts that lobbyists and their clients present facts in the light most favorable 
to their policy interests;113 thus, the political, economic, or other agendas of those interest groups 
whose lobbyists succeed in securing the ear of elected officials and their aides inevitably affect 
the shape of the public policy that is enacted.114 Accordingly, the identity and views of the 
lobbyists and interests with whom elected officials and their staff consult are highly 
consequential features of the legislative process.
Relatedly, the relative ideological diversity of the lobbyists and groups with which 
individual officials and their aides meet can be a crucial determinant of where along the political 
spectrum each official’s policy preferences on particular issues will fall.115 Legal scholarship on 
111
  Elected officials certainly behave in this manner in the campaign finance context, taking 
money from interest groups on both sides of an issue and/or taking money from a group but voting 
against that group’s interests on legislation.  See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Medical Industry Showers Congress 
With Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at A1 (discussing, for example, contributions made to Rep. 
Peter Stark).
112 See supra notes 72, 76, and accompanying text.
113 See, e.g., 1950 House Report, supra note __, at 27 (noting that in lobbyist communications 
with members of Congress, “[f]acts are seldom presented for their own sake, or without having been 
carefully selected for maximum impact”).
114 See, e.g., John R. Wright, Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House 
of Representatives, 84 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 417 (1990) (reporting results of an empirical study 
demonstrating that representatives’ voting decisions in committee, particularly in the Ways and Means 
Committee, bear a strong correlation to the number of lobbying contacts they received from groups on 
either side of an issue).
115 See, e.g., Evans, supra note 26, at 257-59 (concluding, based on a study of the House Public 
Works and Transportation Committee’s behavior during consideration of a highway reauthorization bill, 
that interest groups are most effective at getting the majority of their policy preferences accepted when 
they face no competition for elected officials’ attention from opposing interests).
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the subject of group polarization116 suggests that if an elected official consults with a 
homogenous set of interest groups representing only one side of an issue — whether because 
those interests contributed to his campaign or because those interests share the official’s political 
ideology — then the public policy generated by that official will become polarized, or skewed in 
an extreme direction, because the official is hearing from a “limited argument pool” whose ideas 
tend to feed off each other and push the official to an extreme position.117  Lobbying by 
coalitions of like-minded interest groups, a growing phenomenon,118 likely only makes this 
problem worse.  Sunstein posits that such polarization creates “deliberative trouble” because 
“widespread error and social fragmentation are likely to result when like-minded people, 
insulated from others, move in extreme directions simply because of limited argument pools and 
parochial influences.”119  Thus, to the extent possible, it is important to ensure that elected 
officials hear from interests on both sides of a policy issue.120 When elected officials, or the staff 
who assist in making policy recommendations to such officials, receive information from and 
hear the concerns of interests on both sides of an issue, then rather than become polarized, their 
policy positions are likely to become tempered, balanced, and more informed.  Indeed, Sunstein 
speculates that polarization will end or reverse when the argument pool is expanded and new 
members add new arguments.121
Current lobbying regulations provide no mechanism or incentive for such diversity of 
access, because they reveal nothing about how individual officials allocate access across 
different lobbyists and their interest group clients.  Lobbying reforms that require elected 
officials to disclose their contacts with particular lobbyists on behalf of particular interests, 
however, would shed some light on whether a particular elected official takes all of her cues 
from interests of a particular stripe or whether she gives audience to interests on all sides of an 
issue.  The threat of such exposure, moreover, could encourage (or force) elected officials, or at 
least their staffs, to split their dance-cards more evenly between opposing interests, for fear of 
how it will look to the electorate, and other interest groups, if lobbying disclosures reveal them to 
116
 Group polarization is a theory positing that members of a deliberating group move predictably 
toward a more extreme point in the direction of group members’ pre-deliberation tendencies.  Like 
“polarized molecules,” group members become even more aligned in the direction in which they already 
were tending.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?  Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J.
71, 74-75 (2000) (quoting JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP 142 (1987));
Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 
Cornell L. Rev. 486, 535-36 (2002) (citing Amiram Vinokur & Eugene Burnstein, Effects of Partially 
Shared Persuasive Arguments on Group-Induced Shifts:  A Group-Problem-Solving Approach, 29 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 305, 306-07 (1974)).
117 See id. at 104-05.
118 [Cite]. 
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 Sunstein, supra note 116, at 105.
120 See, e.g., Congress and Pressure Groups, supra note 1, at 13 (quoting statement by ACLU 
that “ [w]hen groups push on both sides of an issue, officials can more freely exercise their judgment than 
when the groups push on only one side”).
121 See Sunstein, supra note 116, at 95-96.
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be unduly partial to one set of interests.  Such a shaming mechanism may be the most effective 
institutional method available to ensure that deliberating legislators do not isolate themselves 
from competing views.
III. HOW TO FIX THE LDA:  INTEREST GROUPS, THE OVER-LOOKED FACTOR
Lobbying regulations traditionally have paid little attention to interest groups; in fact, the 
only portion of the LDA directed towards such groups is the requirement that lobbyists disclose 
the names of their clients.  This is because in focusing on lobbying regulation as a means of (1) 
combating quid pro quo corruption, and the appearance thereof, and (2) protecting elected 
officials from lobbyist harassment, Congress has ignored the public’s underlying concern with 
the preferential access and disproportionate ability to influence legislative agendas that the 
lobbying process affords to certain interests.  Moreover, Congress has ignored the fact that 
interest groups are the driving force behind the lobbying process and that, without them, 
lobbyists would have no one to advocate for and no need to seek access to elected officials.  This 
Part suggests that the LDA’s ignorance of interest group’s role in the lobbying process is almost 
as glaring an omission as the Act’s failure to impose any regulations on elected officials.  Indeed, 
given Congress’ distorted incentives, a focus on interest groups may well be the key to effecting 
meaningful lobbying regulation.
A. The Potential Impact of Greater Transparency on Interest Group Dynamics
In crafting lobbying reform, it is important to consider not only what current regulations
fail to achieve, but also what incentives and consequences they succeed in producing.  One oft-
overlooked consequence of current disclosure requirements is that they create a system through 
which opposing interests can obtain information about their competitors’ lobbying activities.122
Interest groups, unlike ordinary citizens, tend to be familiar with the names of other interest 
groups; thus the LDA, in permitting the public to look up lobbyist registration statements by 
client name, enables interest groups to discover which lobbyists their competitors have hired, 
how much their competitors have spent on lobbying, the general issues on which their 
competitors’ lobbying activities have focused, and even, to some extent, the federal departments 
or congressional committees that have been lobbied on their competitors’ behalves.  In so doing, 
the LDA provides organized interests with information they can use to step-up their own 
lobbying efforts to match those of their competitors.  Herein lies the great promise of lobbying 
regulation:  Instead of shuddering in horror at this realization, reformers should embrace it.  That 
is, reformers should approach lobbying reform with the view that since organized interest groups 
are the political actors with the greatest incentive to take advantage of disclosures in the lobbying 
game, it is most efficient to structure lobbying regulations in a way that makes it likely that, as 
these interests act to maximize their own best interests, they also will further public goals.  In 
other words, lobbying regulations should be designed to ensure that opposing interests get the 
122 See, e.g., Gil Klein, 2 Push Congress to Get Cracking on Lobbying Bill Lawmakers Cite 
Campaign Promises, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 1994, at A20 (noting that some lobbyists liked 
the then-draft LDA because “[b]y requiring all lobbyists to disclose details of their business, competitors 
can check up on each other”). 
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kind of information that will help them to counterbalance each other as well as encourage them 
to bring their competitors’ disclosures to the public’s attention; i.e., lobbying regulations should 
produce information not only about which lobbyists competing interests hire, or how much those 
lobbyists are paid, but also about the amount of access that those lobbyists obtain vis-à-vis
specific elected officials.  This, of course, dovetails naturally with the public’s interest in 
learning how much access its elected officials provide to particular lobbyists and their interest 
group clients.
The aim should be to create a system through which interests groups carefully can 
monitor their competitors’ lobbying registration statements and can use the detailed disclosures 
therein (1) to inform the public of any disparities between the lobbying access granted to their 
competitors versus to interests on their side; and (2) to increase their own substantive lobbying 
efforts to counterbalance the information provided by their competitors.  In this way, disclosures 
made under the LDA actively could be brought to the public’s attention and, at the same time, 
targeted efforts could be made by interests themselves to force elected officials to listen to 
arguments on both sides of an issue before making policy decisions.  As a result, legislators 
should be better informed and public policy should become more balanced.
What I am advocating, in other words, is that lobbying regulations embrace the familiar 
Madisonian concept of allowing factions to check factions in service of the public good.123  The 
idea is to shift vigilance over lobbying activities away from members of the public, who current 
regulations disingenuously assume will pay attention to lobbying disclosures of their own 
initiative, and towards interest groups.  Instead of relying on reactions from the all-too-often 
disengaged public, lobbying regulations should rely on the normal workings of the political 
process —i.e., on competing interests’ natural incentives to bring elected officials’ contacts with 
lobbyists and interest groups to the public’s notice and to press officials to listen to groups on 
both sides of an issue.  This potential vigilance from within the political process is what Madison 
heralded as the saving grace of a large republic composed of numerous and varied interests.124
But the suggestion that would-be reformers use interest groups’ natural incentives to 
promote more balanced legislating is not purely utilitarian; I do not advocate it because I believe 
it to be the only type of reform that will work given the irremediable reality of interest group 
(faction) behavior.  Rather, I believe that using competing interests to broaden elected officials’ 
views is a normatively good idea.  As Sunstein has acknowledged in the context of group 
polarization, the ideal solution to one-sided interest group interactions with elected officials is 
not necessarily to eliminate private group deliberation and ensure that all policymaking occurs 
within a large and heterogeneous public sphere — for such a solution would produce the 
countervailing problem of drowning out minority viewpoints.125 Some private, “enclave 
deliberation” should continue to occur in order to “increase the diversity of society’s aggregate 
‘argument pool’” and protect minority interests.126 A system of lobbying regulation that employs 
123 See THE FEDERALIST, NO. 10 (James Madison).
124 See THE FEDERALIST, NO. 10, at 64-65 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
125
 Sunstein, supra note 116, at 105.
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competing interests to ensure that legislators hear from both sides of an issue incorporates the 
best of both kinds of group deliberation:  Majority concerns and a variety of viewpoints can be 
brought to light on the House and Senate floors and in conference committees, while “enclave 
deliberation” by like-minded people with intense preferences on either side of an issue can occur 
within interest groups themselves and in private meetings between elected officials and interest 
groups.
In addition to promoting equal access and more balanced legislating, competing interests 
can and should be encouraged to use lobbying disclosures to increase voter competence.  Voters 
are, for the most part, “civic slackers,” disengaged from politics and disinclined to spend their 
free time learning about candidates for elective office, let alone combing lobbying disclosure 
statements to uncover candidates’ relationships with lobbyists.127  Thus, they need “information 
entrepreneurs”128 to bring information to them, in an accessible and useful form.  Interests groups 
are ideal information entrepreneurs because they have inherent incentives to examine lobbying 
disclosures thoroughly and to present information gleaned therefrom to voters in terms that 
voters can understand and that relate directly to electoral issues.  For example, a disfavored 
interest group might, in furtherance of its own self-interest, seek to alert voters that 
“Congressman A met with representatives of the gun lobby X times for a total of Y hours last 
year, but never [or only once, or only for Z hours] with groups favoring tougher handgun 
regulation.”  Groups that enjoy the greatest power and access conversely might use the disclosed 
information to boast to their members about how much access they receive, noting for example 
that, “Our gun lobbyists spent 20 hours with Congressman B last year and the other side spent 
only 15 minutes with him.  Look what great access we’re getting.  Keep those checks coming!”  
Both such uses of lobbying disclosure would result in greater public awareness of specific 
elected officials’ contacts with lobbyists for specific interests, and would provide the public with 
useful heuristic cues about how specific elected officials are likely to approach various policy 
issues if (re)elected.  Of course, lobbying reforms designed to encourage interest groups to 
publicize lobbying disclosures in furtherance of their own narrow political interests may result 
in soundbite-type dissemination of information about elected officials’ lobbying contacts, rather 
than in an impartial presentation of the facts, but at least such reforms would provide voters with 
some information about lobbyists’ access to elected officials — which is far more than can be 
said of current lobbying regulations.
B. A + B = C:  Interest Group Incentives + Public Goals = New LDA Reforms
The preceding section describes the potential promise of using interest group incentives 
to implement lobbying reforms that will achieve the public goals of voter competence, equal 
access, and more balanced legislating.  But how precisely should reformers go about harnessing
interest group incentives?  This section discusses some possibilities, pausing to compare and 
contrast reforms suggested by an interest-group-based approach to lobbying regulation with 
those currently under consideration by Congress.  
127 See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note __, at 1727 (quoting Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic 
Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 901-02 (1998)).
128 See, e.g., Garrett & Smith, supra note 96, at __(6).
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1. Who and What Must Be Disclosed
a.  Disclosure by Public Officials
First, lobbying regulations must require disclosure of the information that is most useful 
to competing interests and the public.  If, as I have suggested, interest groups care about the 
relative political access they receive to elected officials, compared to that received by their 
competitors, then lobbying reforms cannot be effective unless they compel lobbyists to reveal the 
extent of their lobbying contacts with individual elected officials.  This means that lobbying 
regulations must require disclosure not only of the particular elected officials or members of 
congressional or executive staffs whom a lobbyist has contacted, but also of the approximate 
amount of time the lobbyist has spent with the official or staff member(s).  Further, in order to 
address the public’s concerns and enable interest groups to gauge the relative responsiveness of 
specific officials, elected officials, in addition to lobbyists, should be required to file lobbying 
disclosure statements listing the lobbyists (and their interest group clients) with which the 
officials and their staff members have met and approximating the aggregate amount of time spent 
with each lobbyist or interest group, and describing the general context of such meetings (e.g., 
in-office, fundraiser, lunch, travel, golf course).  Specifically, elected officials could be required 
to make an “office disclosure” listing the approximate aggregate amount of a time spent by the 
official and/or members of his staff in meeting with a particular lobbyist on behalf of a particular 
client, as well as breaking down that larger number into time spent with the official and time 
spent with staff.  To avoid constitutional problems, these disclosures need not reveal the specifics 
of what was discussed between lobbyists and elected officials, but need only describe the issue or 
bill concerning which the lobbying contact was made.  In addition, time spent by officials or 
their staff in reviewing informational reports or memoranda provided by a lobbyist should be 
listed on the disclosure form, so as to avoid circumvention problems.129
Mandatory disclosures of elected officials’ contacts with lobbyists would provide interest 
groups with a method of evaluating their success, vis-à-vis opposing interests, in gaining access 
to specific elected officials.  Indeed, disclosures of this kind would enable interests to discover 
patterns in an elected official’s lobbying contacts and/or identify particular officials whom they 
may have overlooked and whom they may wish to focus additional resources educating, in the 
future, in order to counterbalance their competitors’ efforts.  In addition, such disclosures would 
enable other interested parties, including candidates for elective office and the press, to act as 
information entrepreneurs and bring data about an incumbent’s lobbying contacts to the public’s 
attention, at least in election years.  Perhaps of less immediate interest to the public, disclosures 
about the access that lobbyists receive vis-à-vis elected officials would help academics, think 
tanks, and public interest groups conduct research studies — comparing, for example, the 
relative effectiveness of campaign contributions versus lobbying in influencing elected officials, 
or evaluating how effective campaign contributions are as a means of securing access to elected 
129
 It seems unnecessary to require disclosure of other written communications — e.g., letters —
because such writings do not encapsulize the special access with which the public seems to be concerned, 
but rather, constitute communications of the type that even ordinary citizens can and do engage in.
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officials130 — which then can be shared with society at large and used to inform future regulatory 
reform efforts.
Some of the reform proposals currently under consideration by Congress take a step in 
the right direction by advocating that lobbyists disclose their contacts with specific elected 
officials.131  But pending proposals do not go far enough, because they (1) require no estimation 
of the amount of time — i.e., the amount of access — a group has received with a particular 
official, and (2) fail to require any disclosures whatsoever by elected officials.  In so doing,
pending proposals ignore the public’s official-centric and access-related concerns about the 
lobbying process, as well as the substantial dynamic benefits to be gained from disclosure by 
both officials and lobbyists about the amount of access granted to various interests.  Lobbying 
regulations that require disclosure of lobbyist-official contacts from both lobbyists and elected 
officials are likely to engender more accurate reporting from both sets of actors than are 
regulations that require disclosures from only one side.  This is because the ability to cross-
reference lobbyists’ reports of elected-official access with elected officials’ own reports 
increases either side’s incentives to make thorough reports, lest they be accused of 
underreporting based on inconsistencies between the two sets of reports.  Further , requiring 
disclosure by elected officials might give such officials greater incentive to pay attention to the 
interest groups behind the lobbyists with whom they are meeting, since lobbying regulations 
would require officials to disclose not only the names of the lobbyists they have consulted but 
also the interests on whose behalf those lobbyists were acting.  Elected officials, of course, have 
an interest in knowing who is lobbying them — indeed, that is a significant part of the rationale 
behind the current disclosure-based system of lobbying regulation132 — but to the extent that 
current disclosures do not provide enough information about the real interests a lobbyist 
represents or that certain officials may be less than fully diligent in ascertaining such interests,133
regulations requiring disclosures by officials themselves should force officials more seriously to 
contemplate the source of the information provided by lobbyists.  Finally, disclosure by elected 
130 See, e.g., de Figueiredo & Garrett, supra note 40, at 609-10 (speculating about such issues in 
the absence of substantial empirical work); Wright, supra note __, at 418 (similarly hypothesizing about 
such issues).  
131 See Special Interest Lobbying and Ethics Accountability Act of 2005, H.R. 2412, 109th Cong., 
1st Sess., §104 (2005); Lobbying and Ethics Reform Act of 2005, S. 1398, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., §104 
(2005).
132 See sources cited supra notes 83 & 84 and accompanying text; United States v. Harriss, 347 
U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (noting that “[p]resent-day legislative complexities are such that individual 
members of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are regularly 
subjected.  Yet full realization of the American ideal of government by elected representatives depends to 
no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures”).
133
 Insiders indicate that public officials meet many people without knowing whether they are 
lobbyists or not, let alone what interests they represent, particularly in contexts such as receptions or 
fundraisers.  “The Senator is approached by someone that he does not know, who gives his or her name 
and then starts to harangue the Senator about a public policy issue. The petitioner may be a lobbyist or 
not. The Senator does not know.”  E-mail from Bill Dauster, Democratic General Counsel, United States 
Senate Finance Committee (Aug. 23, 2005, 07:54 EST) (on file with the author).  [Cite conversation with 
Andrea Cohen?].
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officials could be used to help level the playing field between moneyed and non-moneyed 
interests.  There has been some concern that the costs of filing disclosure reports may, at the 
margin, discourage non-profits and other less wealthy interests from lobbying;134 if elected 
officials were required to disclose their contacts with such interests, then regulators would have 
some latitude to ease reporting burdens on non-profits and to rely on official’s reports to provide 
information about non-profits’ lobbying activity, should they deem this to be an equitably 
necessary solution.
Requiring elected officials to make disclosures about their lobbying contacts in this 
fashion is not an entirely unprecedented or fanciful idea.  The importance of having disclosure 
statutes require information both from elected officials and from those who seek to influence 
them long has been accepted in the related context of campaign finance regulations, which 
require candidates to report the names of those who contribute to their political campaigns.  And 
at least a few observers and academics had suggested, even before the recent spate of reform 
proposals, that lobbying regulations should require lobbyists to disclose the specific members of 
Congress or executive branch officials whom they contact. 135  Further, the recent scandals 
involving Jack Abramoff and Representative DeLay prompted former Speaker of the House 
Newt Gingrich, on at least one occasion, to call for weekly Internet disclosures of all contacts 
between lobbyists and elected or appointed officials.136
b. Grassroots Lobbying
If lobbying reforms are to help interests on either side of an issue counterbalance each
other’s lobbying activities effectively, then they must provide opposing interests with 
information about the full extent of their competitors’ lobbying activities, including grassroots 
lobbying efforts. “Grassroots lobbying” refers to efforts by lobbyists or interest groups to 
134 See also FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 254-55 (1986) (expressing 
concern, in the related context of election-related political activity, that “[d]etailed record-keeping and 
disclosure obligations. . . impose administrative costs that many small entities may be unable to bear.  
Furthermore, such duties require a far more complex and formalized organization than many small groups 
could manage. . .  Faced with the need to assume a more sophisticated organizational form, to adopt 
specific accounting procedures, to file periodic detailed reports, . . . it would not be surprising if at least 
some groups decided that the contemplated political activity was simply not worth it”); 1993 LDA 
Hearing, supra note 50, at 207-213 (statement of Nan Aron, Executive Director of Alliance for Justice) 
(“[W]e are nevertheless deeply concerned that the principal effect of the bill will not be to increase the 
amount of information available to the public, but will be to decrease the amount of advocacy undertaken 
by public interest and other citizen organizations.”).
135 See, e.g., Letter from the Professional Lobbying & Consulting Center to House Judiciary 
Committee Chairman, printed in 1993 LDA Hearing, supra note 50, at 284-85; Garrett, Levin, & Ruger, 
supra note __, at 147; Prepared Statement of Wright H. Andrews, Jr., Subcomm. on Admin. Law and 
Gov’t Relations of the House Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 31, 1993), reprinted in 1993 LDA Hearings, supra
note 50, at 303, 305.
136 See, e.g., Todd S. Purdum, The Nation:  Go Ahead, Try to Stop K Street, NEW YORK TIMES, 
Jan. 8, 2006, at 41.  See also Newt as Diogenes in a Dark Capitol, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 7, 2006, at 
A10 (quoting Mr. Gingrich as warning Republicans that “You can’t have a corrupt lobbyist without a 
corrupt member or a corrupt staffer on the other end”).
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contact constituents — either through media and mail advertising or through direct contacts — in 
order to convince them of the group’s position (if they are not already disposed to favor it ),137
and to encourage them to participate in letter or telephone campaigns expressing their views, en 
masse, to elected officials in the hope that this will change the official’s policy position.138
Grassroots lobbying is a fast-growing and important lobbying tactic in today’s world;139 absent 
mandatory disclosure of this lobbying tactic, interest groups cannot obtain a complete picture of 
their competitors’ efforts to influence elected officials or particular policy outcomes.  Indeed, 
disclosure of grassroots lobbying efforts may in some ways be more important than disclosure of 
other lobbying activities:  Because votes are the ultimate currency in politics, and because 
officials must win reelection in order to continue in their jobs, lobbyists’ and interest groups’ 
ability to demonstrate (or generate the appearance of) public support for their positions may be 
the most critical element in convincing elected officials to support their policy preferences.140
Moreover, if grassroots lobbying is left unregulated by LDA reforms, it will only become more 
prevalent, as lobbyists and interest groups gain a substantial incentive to shift their resources to 
this tactic in an effort to avoid full disclosure of their lobbying activities.141  In addition, failure 
to include grassroots lobbying regulation in the LDA would exacerbate the unequal access 
problem by disproportionately shielding from disclosure the lobbying activities of those interest 
groups that have substantial resources to spend on advertising campaigns and other means of 
reaching constituents, and which are well-organized enough to orchestrate letter or telephone 
campaigns.
In terms of specifics, grassroots lobbying regulations need not require disclosure of the 
names of individuals who belong to or are contacted by particular interest group organizations or 
their lobbyists; they need only mandate disclosure of the fact that a group or its lobbyist has 
spent $X for, e.g., “television advertisements in the State of Kansas educating residents about 
proposed revisions to emissions standards in the Clean Air Act” or “grassroots lobbying, 
contacting residents of Denver, Colorado to encourage them to let their Congressmen know that 
they support our position on the minimum wage.”  The SILEAA and LERA reform proposals 
currently under consideration in Congress contain a well-worded disclosure provision that would 
capture this kind of information about grassroots lobbying communications, while explicitly 
exempting communications from an interest group to its own members.142  As discussed infra
137
 Grassroots lobbying campaigns typically are targeted towards those who already are members 
of the interest group running the campaign or who otherwise are inclined to support the group’s public 
policy goals. See, e.g., Ron Faucheux, The Grassroots Explosion, 16 CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS 20, 22 
(December/January 1995) (Grassroots Lobbying Glossary Box).
138 See id.
139 See, e.g., id. at 20; Peggy Schmidt, The New Tax Bill; Legislative Mills Stir Up Lobbying, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1986, at 16. 
140 See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note __, at 1723 (“[V]oters ultimately control politicians’ 
access to representational opportunities through the vote, and money thus is useful solely in influencing 
voters’ choices.”).  
141 Cf. de Figueiredo and Garrett, supra note 40, at 623-24 (describing how political actors, in the 
analogous campaign finance context, responded to each successive campaign finance reform effort by 
directing their money to those avenues of spending that had been left unregulated).
142 The section defines grassroots lobbying as “an attempt to influence legislation or executive 
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Section III.C.2, such disclosures should not violate the First Amendment because they do not 
require revelation of interest groups’ members’ identities.
c. Aggressive Client Disclosure
Experience in the analogous field of campaign finance and direct democracy (referenda) 
teaches that many interests will seek to avoid full disclosure of their lobbying activities by 
creating separate organizations, subsidiaries, or coalitions with unrelated names which then can 
be used as the vehicles for making campaign contributions or hiring lobbyists; in this way, only 
the name of the separate organization, subsidiary, or coalition — rather than the recognizable 
name of the parent organization or interest group — need appear on campaign finance or 
lobbying disclosure forms.143  Such “veiled political actors”144 can subvert the entire purpose of 
disclosure statutes by effectively shielding their lobbying activities from public view and causing 
voters and competing interests to draw inaccurate conclusions about the true nature of the groups 
to whom elected officials have granted political access, and by whom such officials may have 
been influenced, on a particular issue.  This problem is exacerbated by the fact that at least some 
interests intentionally seek to mislead voters through the use of patriotic or populist sounding 
names, which in some instances make them appear to represent neutral policy positions or even 
positions directly opposite to their true ones.145
The LDA already requires disclosure of “the name, address, and principal place of 
business of any organization” that “contributes more than $10,000 toward the lobbying 
activities” of the registered lobbyist.146 Some pending reform proposals would go one step 
further, providing that individual members of lobbying coalitions or associations be treated as 
lobbyist “clients” and mandating disclosure of such members’ names.147 These proposals are a 
good start, but in order effectively to combat the inevitable veiled actor problem, lobbying 
action through the use of mass communications directed to the general public and designed to encourage 
recipients to take specific action with respect to legislation or executive action, except that such term does 
not include any communications by an entity directed to its members.” H.R. 2412, 109th Cong., §106 
(2005); Lobbying and Ethics Reform Act of 2005, S. 1398, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., §106 (2005).  Perhaps 
less well-worded, but also sufficient, is the definition contained in the LTAA, which characterizes as 
grassroots lobbying “any attempt to influence the general public, or segments thereof, to engage in 
lobbying contacts whether or not those contacts were made on behalf of a client” but excepting “any 
attempt . . . by a person or entity directed to its members, employees, officers, or shareholders, unless 
such attempt is financed with funds directly or indirectly received from or arranged by a retained 
registrant.”  LTAA, S. 2128, 109th Cong., §105(a)(2).
143 See Garrett & Smith, supra note 96.
144 See id.
145 See id. at (22, 35) (describing, for example, creation of organization with neutral-sounding 
name “U.S. Term Limits” by Republican oil executives who wished to hide their party affiliation); id. at 
(40 & n.117) (describing conservative foundations’ use of nonprofit organizations named the “American 
Civil Rights Coalition” and “American Civil Rights Institute” to promote anti-affirmative action 
initiatives).
146
 2 U.S.C. §1603(b)(3)(A).
147 See Special Interest Lobbying and Ethics Accountability Act of 2005, H.R. 2412, 109th Cong., 
1st Sess., §107 (2005); Lobbying and Ethics Reform Act of 2005, S. 1398, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., §107.
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reforms also should require elected officials and lobbyists to identify the names of organizations 
who own more than a threshold percentage of the named client organization or of any 
organization that contributes more than $10,000 to the lobbying activities of the named client
organization.  In other words, lobbying regulations should ensure the exposure of all major 
entities that may be involved in a layered organizational structure underlying the named lobbying 
entity or lobbying client.  For the sake of consistency, the wording of such a provision can track 
that currently used by the LDA to ensure disclosure of any  layered organizational structures 
involving foreign entities, and can adopt the 20% ownership threshold employed in that 
section.148  All such disclosure requirements should apply equally to nonprofit organizations 
which, as shown by Garrett and Smith in the direct democracy context, otherwise are likely to be 
used by corporate entities or wealthy political activists to circumvent other lobbying disclosure 
rules.149
2. Technical Reforms
a. Quarterly Filings
If competing interests are to be expected to counterbalance each other effectively and to 
bring information about elected officials’ lobbying contacts to voters’ attention in time for 
popular elections, then they must themselves receive such information in a timely fashion.  
Disclosed information is, of course, most useful if disseminated while it is current and still 
accurately describes the lobbying practices of those involved; as the lag between the lobbying 
activity or access described and the date of disclosure increases, the value of the disclosed 
information will become proportionately less and less useful.  Yet the LDA currently requires 
that lobbying disclosures be made only once every six months, by which time the information 
revealed will have become quite stale.  Worse, as discussed earlier, even this six-month 
disclosure period has been treated in an exceedingly casual and flexible manner, with 20% of 
lobbying disclosure forms filed more than three months late and thousands filed more than six 
months late.150  Thus, in order to ensure the usefulness of lobbying disclosures, LDA reforms 
must require more frequent and more stringent reporting deadlines.  In this respect, current 
reform proposals are on the correct track, with provisions requiring that lobbying disclosures be 
148 See 2 U.S.C. §1603(b)(4):
“Each registration under this section shall contain—
. . . .
(4) the name, address, principal place of business, amount of any contribution of more 
than $10,000 to the lobbying activities of the registrant, and approximate percentage of equitable 
ownership in the client (if any) of any foreign entity that--
(A) holds at least 20 percent equitable ownership in the client or any organization 
identified under paragraph (3);
(B) directly or indirectly, in whole or in major part, plans, supervises, controls, directs, 
finances, or subsidizes the activities of the client or any organization identified under paragraph 
(3); or
(C) is an affiliate of the client or any organization identified under paragraph (3) and has 
a direct interest in the outcome of the lobbying activity.”
149
 Garrett & Smith, supra note 96, at (30, 35).
150 See sources cited supra note 62.
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filed on a quarterly, rather than a semi-annual, basis151 and that such disclosures be filed 
electronically in order to ensure timely public access.152  Quarterly filings, which were the norm 
under the 1946 FRLA,153 would provide reasonably up-to-date information without overly 
burdening lobbyists or interest groups, while the enforcement reforms suggested infra subsection 
II.C.3.b should ameliorate the late filing problem.
b. Accessibility of Disclosed Information
In order to be most useful to competing interests and the public, lobbying disclosure 
forms also should be easily accessible, searchable, cross-referenceable, and user-friendly.
Immediate online availability of disclosure forms, as occurs with campaign finance disclosures, 
is a must for widespread accessibility.  Current reform proposals recognize this, and accordingly 
require mandatory electronic filing of all lobbying reports.154  In addition, lobbying disclosure 
forms should be downloadable, so that interest groups can make use of and disseminate 
information from such forms quickly and simply.  Disclosure forms also should be easily 
searchable, by interest group name, bill number or general issue area, elected official contacted, 
lobbyist name, and filing date, so that competing interests, members of the public, the press, 
campaign officials, academics, and other interested parties can discover any information they 
seek efficiently and accurately. Recent reform proposals appear to address the need for such 
electronic manipulability, requiring that a public database of lobbying disclosure information be 
made available over the internet, at no charge, “in a searchable, sortable, and downloadable 
manner” that links directly to information disclosed under certain sections of the FECA.155
3. Restrictions and Penalties
a. Eliminate Restrictions on Lobbying by 501(c)(4)s
As mentioned earlier, the current LDA contains one particularly troubling provision that 
renders certain nonprofit organizations, as defined in Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue 
Code, ineligible to receive federal awards, grants, contracts, and loans if they engage in lobbying 
activities.156  This provision appears to have arisen in response to the general anti-lobbying mood 
of the 1992-1995 period and the related notion that public funds should not be used to subsidize 
an activity that is hated by the public, on behalf of organizations with whose positions not all 
taxpayers agree.157  But the practical impact of such a provision is to create unequal access 
151 See Special Interest Lobbying and Ethics Accountability Act of 2005, H.R. 2412, 109th Cong., 
1st Sess., §101 (2005); LTAA, S. 2128, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., §101 (2005); Lobbying and Ethics Reform 
Act of 2005, S. 1398, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., §101 (2005).
152 SILEAA, §102; LTAA §102; LERA, §102.
153 See 2 U.S.C. §264 (repealed 1995).
154
 H.R. 2412, 109th Cong., §102 (2005); S. 2128, 109th Cong., §102 (2005); S. 1398, 109th
Cong., §102 (2005).
155 See H.R. 2412, 109th Cong., §103(a)(9) (2005); S. 2128, 109th Cong., §103(a)(9) (2005); S. 
1398, 109th Cong., §103(a)(9) (2005).
156
 2 U.S.C. §1611; see supra note 100 and accompanying text.
157 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S10538, S10540 (Remarks by Sen. Alan Simpson, sponsor of the 
501(c)(4) provision); Lobbying By Groups Receiving Federal Funds, Hearing Before the House Comm. 
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between different types of interest groups.  Its effect, in essence, is to preclude or substantially 
restrict the ability of certain interests — i.e., those that rely on federal funds to operate, and that
have particular types of missions, as defined in the tax code — to compete in the information-
providing-influence-seeking lobbying game, thus tipping the legislative balance in favor of those 
interests that have more money.158  Nonprofit organizations should not have to muster the 
support of the entire citizenry — an impossible standard given the variety of viewpoints held by 
citizens throughout the country on a broad spectrum of issues — in order to be allowed to share 
their members’ views with elected officials or to educate elected officials on the effects of 
certain policy decisions, without foregoing their entitlement to federal assistance.
The LDA’s restrictions on lobbying by 501(c)(4)s undermine the goal of relying on 
interest group competition to produce a balanced presentation of information to elected officials 
and, thereby, more balanced legislating.  There cannot be balanced legislating if certain interests 
effectively are shut out of the access/influence game.  Thus, it is imperative that proposals for 
reform of the LDA include the elimination of restrictions on 501(c)(4) organizations.
Unfortunately, all of the lobbying reform proposals pending in Congress at this time are
completely silent on the subject of such restrictions.
Current law also limits the amount that nonprofits organized under 501(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code may spend on lobbying activities without paying taxes, providing that 
once a qualifying organization exceeds the limit, it will have to pay taxes on 25% of its excess 
lobbying expenditures.159  This provision is admirably tailored to promote equitable treatment of 
nonprofit versus for-profit interests.  However, as LDA reforms become effective, and more 
information becomes available regarding the relative lobbying expenditures and access obtained 
by nonprofits versus their competitors, Congress may wish to tinker with the lobbying limits 
and/or tax rate figures currently in effect.
b. LDA Enforcement
A system of lobbying regulation that depends on transparency, and political actors’ 
responses to disclosed information, will be only as effective as its disclosures are accurate.  As 
discussed earlier, meaningful enforcement is crucial to ensuring the accuracy and usefulness of 
information disclosed under the LDA.160  The Act’s current enforcement mechanisms are truly 
symbolic:  They provide for no investigations, audits, or other checks on the validity of 
information disclosed by lobbyists, and for little punishment even if a disclosure violation 
miraculously is found.  In order to remedy this situation, lobbying reforms must give substantial 
investigative and enforcement authority over the LDA to an executive agency which can, 
On Gov’t Reform (testimony of Terrence Scanlon, President of the Capital Research Center) (June 29, 
1995), available at 1995 WL 407997.
158
 Organizations can get around this restriction to some extent by, for example, splitting into two 
qualifying Section 501(c)(4) organizations, one of which lobbies and the other of which does not, but this 
causes unnecessary administrative hassle and expenses that are likely to interfere with the organizations’ 
ability to lobby effectively.
159 See 26 U.S.C. §4911.
160 See discussion supra notes 61-64, pp. __, and accompanying text. 
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through cross-referencing and other investigative techniques, identify inaccuracies in the 
information reported on lobbying disclosure forms.  Separation of powers concerns dictate that 
this enforcement authority be located in the executive branch, rather than left with the Clerk of 
the House or the Secretary of the Senate, because, among other concerns, placing such authority 
in the hands of agents of Congress impermissibly would encroach upon the executive branch’s 
constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”161  Indeed, the 
Department of Justice has expressed concern that even the current LDA, which expressly 
provides that its provisions should not be “construed to grant general audit or investigative 
authority to the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House,”162 may infringe on the 
executive branch’s authority.163  Moreover, conferring such enforcement authority upon the 
Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate would be ineffective.  The House Clerk and 
Senate Secretary are too close to the lobbying process and daily congressional affairs to be 
entirely impartial or vigilant in uncovering and punishing lobbyists who violate the Act’s 
disclosure requirements.  Indeed, some lobbyists are former members of Congress, with whom 
the Clerk and Secretary once may have worked closely.
For a number of reasons, the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”), which oversees 
enforcement of campaign finance regulations, seems an ideal agency in which to situate 
enforcement authority for the LDA.  First, there are obvious synergies between the disclosures 
made under campaign finance laws and those made under the LDA, including the fact that both 
statutes call for disclosure of lobbyist contributions to candidate campaigns.  Thus, the agency 
charged with oversight of the LDA will have to engage in at least some cross-referencing with 
the FEC in order to check the accuracy of lobbying disclosures.  Further, because lobbying and 
campaign contributions tend to be complementary activities, often conducted in tandem,164 many 
of the providers of lobbying disclosure information are likely to be the same entities who provide 
information about campaign contributions; likewise, many of the consumers of lobbying 
information — i.e., the reporters, public interest groups, and academics who wish to track 
lobbying — also will be the consumers of campaign finance information.   Thus, much of the 
FEC’s experience dealing in the realm of campaign finance can translate directly to the lobbying 
context.  Second, and related to the first, expenses and administrative hassles can be kept to a 
minimum if the LDA confers authority for its enforcement in an existing agency rather than 
creates a new agency, with new offices, personnel, etc. for this purpose.  While the FEC’s budget 
would have to be increased and other enhancements made to enable it to absorb the new duties 
associated with lobbying oversight, such enhancements would prove less burdensome  than 
would creating an entire new agency.
161 U.S. CONST., art. II, §3. 
162
 2 U.S.C. §1607(c).
163 See Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable Henry Hyde, 
Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary (Nov. 7, 1995), contained in H.R. REP. 104-339, at 27 
(1995).
164 See Wright, supra note __, at 418 (citing LARRY J. SABATO, PAC POWER:  INSIDE THE 
WORLD OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES (1984)); Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr. & 
Micky Tripathi, Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked?  New Evidence from the 1995 Lobbying 
Disclosure Act, 4 BUS. & POL. 131, 151-52 (2002).
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In addition, the penalties for inaccurate reporting or noncompliance with lobbying 
regulations must be enhanced in order to give lobbyists and interest groups greater incentives to 
be diligent and forthright in their reporting.  Specifically, fines for inaccurate reporting should be 
changed from the current flat sum of $50,000 to something like 20% of the lobbyist’s fees or the 
interest group’s lobbying expenditures; this would make penalties more equitable across 
lobbyists/interest groups and more painful to the bank accounts of wealthy lobbyists and 
interests.  Moreover, the FEC or other oversight agency should be directed to distribute to major 
news outlets a list of all lobbyists and interest groups that have been fined for making inaccurate 
lobbying disclosures.165  Fear of public reprisal resulting from the revelation of such information 
should encourage lobbyists and interest groups to engage in more accurate reporting.  Finally, in 
order to ensure that the FEC’s newly-conferred investigative powers have teeth, and that they are 
not used in a targeted partisan manner to harass particular officials or lobbyists, lobbying 
regulations could mandate random auditing of lobbyist and official disclosure reports on a 
periodic basis.
4. How and Where Pending Lobbying Reform Proposals Falls Short
The numerous reforms proposed by Congress in 2005 address and, in some instances 
even match, the proposals suggested above.  But they do not go nearly far enough in bridging the 
gap between the public’s and Congress’ concerns.  In fact, the proffered reforms are almost 
entirely superficial, calling for improvements such as quarterly reporting and mandatory online 
accessibility to disclosure forms, without substantively addressing the public’s concerns about 
the access that lobbyists obtain to elected officials.  The SILEAA’s and LERA’s requirement that 
lobbyists disclose the names of specific elected officials with whom they have met pays only lip 
service to the public’s concerns, because it provides no information whatsoever about the relative 
amount of access that different lobbyists obtain to elected officials , and places no responsibility 
on public officials themselves to account to the voters who elected them.
Some of the pending reforms would expand application of lobbying regulations to cover 
grassroots lobbying — an important substantive step — but, as with other disclosures required 
under the LDA, it will be difficult to ensure the accuracy of the grassroots lobbying information 
that interest groups choose to report absent stronger enforcement mechanisms.  Unfortunately,
despite the substantial weaknesses that have been identified in the LDA’s enforcement
mechanisms, current reform proposals offer only minimal, symbolic, enforcement reforms.  The
SILEAA, LTAA, and LERA, for example, would leave all enforcement authority as it is — in 
the hands of the House and Senate clerks, with power in the U.S. Attorney’s office to prosecute 
offenders — but would require the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to investigate and 
report to Congress semi-annually regarding how well the House and Senate clerks are 
165
 Something similar has been suggested in the context of federal campaign finance reform, and 
has been implemented on a city-wide level against delinquent taxpayers.  See Todd Lochner, 
Overdeterrence, Underdeterrence, and a (Half-Hearted) Call for a Scarlet-Letter Approach to Deterring 
Campaign Finance Violations, 2 ELECTION L. J. 23, 24, 32 & n.58 (2003). 
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performing their duties.166  The SILEAA proposal then would require the House Administration 
Committee and Judiciary Committee to hold hearings to consider the implications of any 
recommendations made by the GAO’s reports.167  Thus, all enforcement authority essentially 
would remain with the legislative branch, no entity would be charged with investigating the 
accuracy of lobbying disclosures, and no other checks or balances would exist to ensure accurate 
reporting.  Moreover, the SILEAA, LTAA, and LERA reform proposals offer only minimal 
changes in the civil penalties applicable for violations of the Act, increasing the potential fine for 
failing to file lobbying reports — not for making inaccurate disclosures — from $50,000 to 
$100,000.168 Such a penalty remains a purely symbolic one, amounting to merely a drop in the 
bucket for many lobbyists and interest groups, and is likely to be far less effective than are fines 
based on a percentage of lobbying income or lobbying expenditures, or the threat of media 
publicization of the names of entities who make inaccurate disclosures.
Pending lobbying legislation proposals also offer a number of reforms not dictated by an
interest-group-based approach to lobbying regulation, including extension of the ban on 
revolving door lobbying by former members of Congress to two or more years;169 creation of an 
internal ethics task force;170 and stricter disclosure requirements/bans on lobbyist-sponsored 
travel by elected officials.171 These reforms are little more than direct, symbolic, responses to 
the scandal-of-the-day — i.e., lobbyist Jack Abramoff’s payment of travel expenses for 
numerous elected officials, including Representative Tom DeLay, and their aides.  And while 
they may prove useful in inspiring Congress to ratchet up internal oversight of its own members, 
reforms of this kind fail to address the public’s primary underlying concern about who elected 
officials consult with and listen to when making policy decisions, and about how much access 
respective interest groups and lobbyists receive to particular elected officials.  Extension of the 
ban on lobbying by former members of Congress, for example, sounds good but accomplishes 
little, as it merely delays the onset of a practice that the public considers suspect.  It thus is a 
classic symbolic solution that allows Congress to appease the public superficially while 
continuing as usual a lobbying practice that Congress finds useful.  Likewise, creation of an 
ethics task force and the institution of stricter travel rules enable Congress to appear as though it 
is being tough on its members, but will do little to change the way that lobbying is practiced or to 
provide the public with more information about lobbyist interactions with (as opposed to 
monetary expenditures for) members of Congress.
166 See H.R. 2412, 109th Cong. §401 (2005); S. 2128, 109th Cong. §401 (2005); S. 1398, 109th
Cong. §401 (2005).
167 Id. §403.
168 H.R. 2412, 109th Cong. §402 (2005); S. 2128, 109th Cong. §107 (2005); S. 1398, 109th Cong. 
§108 (2005).
169 H.R. 2412, 109th Cong. §201 (2005); S. 2128, 109th Cong. §201 (2005); S. 1398, 109th Cong. 
§201 (2005); H.R. 3623, 109th Cong. (2005) (recommending a 5-year cooling-off period before allowing 
revolving door lobbying).
170 H.R. 2412, 109th Cong. §404 (2005).
171 H.R. 2412, 109th Cong. §§301-304 (2005); S. 2128, 109th Cong. §§301-304 (2005); S. 1398, 
109th Cong. §§301-307 (2005).
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* * * ** * * *
It should be noted that the reforms suggested in this Section remain centered on 
disclosure, and thus continue the LDA’s primarily symbolic approach to lobbying regulation.  
But while the suggested reforms will not in and of themselves change the way that the lobbying 
process works, the hope is that by taking a dynamic approach — by heeding  the incentives that 
motivate various political actors, and by requiring substantive rather than minimal disclosures, 
these reforms will prompt political actors to change their lobbying-related behavior, instead of 
merely waiting for the public to come around, on its own, to a more favorable view of lobbying
— as preceding reforms have done.
C. Possible Objections and Concerns Regarding The Proposed Reforms
1. Practical Concerns
The primary criticism likely to be leveled against the proposed reforms is that they will 
be unduly burdensome, requiring lobbyists and elected officials to spend an excessive amount of 
time tracking their contacts with each other. But while reforms requiring lobbyists and elected 
officials to disclose the approximate amount of time they have spent together undoubtedly will 
increase the administrative paperwork required of both entities, neither lobbyists nor elected 
officials will have to reinvent the wheel from scratch in order to comply with the new disclosure 
requirements.  Many lobbyists already keep time logs, for client purposes, of their contacts with
congressional and executive branch officials on behalf of specific clients.  Similarly, elected 
officials and their staffs already keep calendars listing their appointments, lunches, speaking 
engagements, etc., with particular lobbyists and interest groups.  Such records could be used as at 
least a starting point for disclosure of lobbying contacts between elected officials and lobbyists. 
Further, the disclosure requirement itself can be crafted with some sensitivity to this concern by,
for example, including a de minimis provision exempting communications with a lobbyist that 
total less than half an hour in a three month period from disclosure, and allowing elected officials 
to approximate the amount of time spent with a lobbyist, rather than requiring strict, law-firm-
style billing specificity.
A second potential problem with reforms that require greater disclosure of lobbyist 
interactions with elected officials is that they might lead the already misinformed public to draw
inaccurate and unfair conclusions about lobbyists’ influence.  Faced, for example, with the 
knowledge that Congresswoman A spent 20 hours meeting with interest group X, and that she 
voted in favor of Legislation Q, which was supported by interest group X, the public might
assume that Congresswoman A voted the way she did because of pressure from interest group X 
— although, in fact, Congresswoman A always may have supported Legislation Q and may have 
met with interest group X in order to strategize with its members about how to convince others to 
vote in favor of the law. 172  But while fears that the public will misinterpret disclosed 
172
 A substantial body of political science literature suggests that this kind of interaction between 
lobbyists and legislators is common – that lobbying efforts do not persuade legislators, but merely 
reinforce or encourage those who already agree with them.  See, e.g., Wright, supra note __, at 419; 
MILBRATH, supra note __; RAYMOND A. BAUER, ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, & LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER, 
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information are not unrealistic, neither are they a problem that should prove fatal to the proposed 
reforms.  The most effective way for Congresswoman A to combat misinterpretations of this 
kind is to spend equal or near-equal amounts of time meeting with interest group X and its
competitors, so that she may be in a position to explain to the public that it was not pressure from 
either group, but her own convictions after considering information presented by either side, that 
formed the basis for her vote.  As Sunstein’s polarization work suggests, reforms that inspire or 
force  Congresswoman A to provide equal time to interest group X’s competitors in this manner, 
even if she does so purely for the sake of public appearances, are likely to result in some 
tempering of Congresswoman A’s views and, accordingly, in a less extreme final version of 
Legislation Q.
Relatedly, the proposed reforms might be criticized on the grounds that they will produce 
more, rather than less, lobbying — a result that could anger the lobbying-hating public and 
undermine the goal of increasing public confidence in the political process. In other words, the 
public may view disclosures detailing the time elected officials spend with lobbyists and interest 
groups as evidence that special interests, rather than public concerns, control government policy.  
This, again, is a realistic danger, but not one that augurs against adopting the proposed reforms.  
More lobbying, as explained above, is not necessarily a bad thing — particularly if it results in a 
more balanced presentation of viewpoints and data to elected officials.  Indeed, more 
evenhanded lobbying by interests on either side of an issue may do a great deal of good for the 
legislative process.  The problem, then, is not with lobbying per se, but with the public’s one-
dimensional view of all lobbying as unequivocally malevolent.  The democratically correct 
solution cannot be to avoid reforms that are good for the legislative process out of fear that the 
public will misinterpret the consequences; rather, it should be to educate the public about the 
value that lobbyists add to the political process.  Specifically, elected officials, perhaps aided by 
public interest groups, should emphasize the informational expertise that lobbyists provide, both 
when campaigning for passage of reforms to the LDA and when making disclosures thereunder.  
For example, when enacting LDA reforms, elected officials should explain to the public that 
policymakers depend on lobbyists to educate them about the impact of certain policy proposals, 
and that the purpose of lobbying reforms is (a) to enable the public to see the type of help and 
influence that lobbyists provide; and (b) to encourage public officials to consult with and obtain 
information from groups on both sides of an issue, to the extent that they are not already doing 
so.  Similarly, when making disclosures under the Act, elected officials should be specific about 
the informational assistance provided by lobbyists — explaining, for example, that they or their 
staff “Met with interest group X for approximately 20 hours, during which time the group’s 
lobbyist provided me with data including Regulation No. 1234’s long-term impact on the quality 
of drinking water.”  In this manner, disclosures revealing that elected officials have met with 
interests on both sides of an issue may help to undermine the notion that officials are controlled, 
rather than assisted, by interest groups.  While efforts such as these may not solve the public 
perception problem entirely, they ought at least to improve the public’s views about the lobbying 
process.  Of course, some of the public’s perceptions about lobbying may be unalterable, but to 
the extent that this is the case, there is little short of outlawing lobbying entirely that LDA 
reforms can do to satisfy the public.
THEIR WORLD 191 (1963).
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A third possible concern that may be raised against the proposed reforms
is that they could disadvantage incumbents.  After all, at election time, voters will have 
information about the lobbying contacts only of those who already have held office — leaving 
challengers for elective office with substantial ammunition to use against incumbents, but 
providing incumbents with no comparable weapon.  Again, this is a realistic concern, but not one 
that should be considered debilitating.  Many challengers for elective office will be prior 
officeholders themselves, as elected officials often are career public servants and are likely to 
have served in other federal positions or in state government before seeking higher or federal 
office. In such cases, information about a challengers’ prior lobbying and interest group contacts 
also should be available in some capacity, particularly if reforms requiring elected officials to 
disclose their lobbying contacts are adopted by state governments.  Even if no lobbying contact 
information is available for a challenger, it hardly is unfair to force incumbents to defend the 
choices they have made, including the people to whom they have chosen to listen, while serving 
at the people’s pleasure.  Indeed, it is appropriate for an incumbent’s prior record to come under 
greater scrutiny than his challenger’s; the incumbent already has been serving in the position for 
which he is seeking reelection, and should be held accountable to his constituents for the manner 
in which he has performed.  In fact, to the extent that the proposed disclosure requirements act to 
disadvantage incumbents, this may even be a beneficial development that helps to balance out
the incumbency advantage — name recognition, franking privilege, etc. — currently enjoyed by 
those running for reelection.
Fourth, the proposed reforms might be criticized on the ground that disclosure of elected 
officials’ lobbying contacts could generate voter backlash against officials who associate with 
particular interest groups.  Elected officials may worry, for example, that conservative, pro-life
voters will react negatively to the revelation that an official has met with a lobbyist representing 
a pro-choice group, or conversely, that liberal voters will be upset upon learning that an official 
has met with a lobbyist for the NRA. In other words, to the extent that voters themselves are 
polarized, they might prefer for officials to provide limited, politically-skewed, access to 
lobbyists and interest groups, rather than for officials to meet with groups on all sides of an issue; 
further, such polarized voters might punish an official who seeks to be more broadly inclusive.  
As a result, elected officials who currently provide balanced access to groups on either side of an 
issue might be forced to cease meeting with interests with whom a majority of their constituents 
disagree.  Such concerns about a potential backlash against particular interests are completely 
hypothetical at this stage, and the likelihood that the above scenario would be played out cannot 
be assessed accurately at this time.  Because elected officials currently do not make any 
disclosures about the access that they provide to interest groups, it is impossible to tell whether 
there are officials from exceedingly conservative districts who meet with Planned Parenthood or 
the ACLU, or whether such officials, if they exist, would find it necessary to cease meeting with 
liberal groups if the proposed disclosure requirements were enacted.  Further, it is impossible to 
tell how the number of elected officials in this position compares to the number of officials who 
currently meet with interests on only one side of an issue and who would, if the proposed 
reforms were enacted, be driven to provide more balanced access to interests on either side of an 
issue.  I suspect that the number of officials in the latter category far surpasses the number of 
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officials in the former category, because only in extremely homogenous districts can voters be 
expected to fall on one side of the spectrum to the exclusion of other interests, and in such 
districts elected officials themselves are likely to be quite polarized and disinclined to meet, of 
their own volition, with groups whose policy preferences differ vastly from the officials’ own.  
To the extent that this is not the case, officials should be able to pitch their meetings with 
interests on both sides of an issue as an act of simple fair play — e.g., “I met with groups on both 
sides of an issue not because I agree wholeheartedly with either side, but because I wanted to 
take into account all viewpoints before making a final decision” — and to make a forceful case 
to the public that the diversity of the groups with whom they have met in fact demonstrates that 
political access does not equate to arm-twisting or a pledge of ideological allegiance.
In the rare case where an official or lobbyist is reluctant to disclose access given to or 
received on behalf of an unpopular, perhaps ostracized, minority interest — the classic examples 
being the NAACP in the 1960s or the Communist Party in the 1950s — for fear of retribution 
against that organization, the reforms can include a provision allowing lobbyists or elected 
officials to apply to the FEC for a ruling authorizing nondisclosure of that particular interest’s 
information, upon a showing that the interest has been treated as a pariah group and/or that there 
is likely to be retaliation against the interest, lobbyist, or official if lobbying contacts with the 
interest are disclosed.
2. Constitutional Concerns
Any proposal to reform the LDA must, of course, be sensitive to the fact that lobbying is 
an activity protected by the First Amendment rights “to petition Government for a redress of 
grievances,”173 and to freedom of speech,174 and that regulations which burden or chill the 
exercise of these rights may be constitutionally suspect.  The reforms suggested in this paper 
should survive constitutional scrutiny for a number of reasons.
First, although lobbying is a protected First Amendment activity, the protection it enjoys 
is not absolute.  As with other First Amendment rights, Congress may impose disclosure 
requirements that burden the rights of petition and speech if it can “convincingly show a 
substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling 
state interest,”175 and if the disclosure requirements are narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s 
interests.176  In fact, lobbying disclosure requirements have received the Supreme Court’s 
express stamp of approval when their purpose is “to maintain the integrity of a basic 
governmental process.”177  The disclosure requirements proposed above clearly fit this 
description, as they are designed to restore the public’s faith in the “integrity of [the] 
governmental process” by providing information that directly relates to the public’s concerns 
173 U.S. CONST., amend. I.
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 As the Supreme Court has recognized, this right includes freedom of political expression and 
protects the free discussion of governmental affairs.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). 
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 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Commission, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
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 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 632 (1954).
177 Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625.
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about lobbyist access:  The underlying premise behind the proposed reforms is that the public 
cares about lobbyists’ ability to interact with and influence elected officials, and that the best 
way to satisfy the public and to ensure its belief in the integrity of government thus is to require 
elected officials and lobbyists to disclose their contacts with each other.
Further, Supreme Court decisions in the campaign finance context suggest that the 
proposed reforms would be found to intrude only minimally upon the freedom of speech and that 
the specific purposes that the reforms are designed to achieve would be held to justify such 
intrusions.  In Buckley v. Valeo,178 for instance, the Court ruled that the governmental interests in 
(1) providing the electorate with meaningful information about candidates and the interests to 
which they are likely to be responsive; and (2) deterring actual corruption and the appearance of 
corruption, justified campaign finance regulations that limited individual contributions and 
required identification of individuals who contribute to a campaign.  Like the campaign finance 
regulations in Buckley, the disclosure requirements proposed in this paper are designed to 
provide the electorate with meaningful information about candidates — i.e., the relative amount 
of access that such candidates have provided to particular lobbyists, on behalf of particular
interest groups, in the course of making policy decisions while in office thus far.  In so doing, the 
proposed reforms also are meant (1) to combat the appearance of corruption by demonstrating to 
the public that political access does not always translate into legislative success, while (2) 
encouraging officials to be listen to groups on both sides of an issue.  Moreover, the proposed
reforms require only the minimum intrusion necessary to address the public’s concerns about 
lobbyist access — i.e., disclosure of elected officials’ contacts with lobbyists; they do not
prohibit any type of lobbying conduct or require disclosure of ordinary citizens’ contacts with 
officials.  In this respect, the proposed reforms are far less burdensome of First Amendment 
rights than FECA’s spending caps, which prohibit conduct, or its requirement that individual 
campaign contributors be identified — both of which were upheld in Buckley.179
Similarly, in McConnell v. FEC,180 the Court rule that the  important governmental 
interest in combating the appearance of “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment”
justified even greater restrictions on campaign spending in the form of soft money donations.181
The McConnell Court noted that if it were to deny Congress the ability to regulate the 
appearance of undue influence, then “the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could 
jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.”182  This 
governmental concern applies equally in the lobbying context, where the risk of “undue 
influence” over an officeholder’s judgment is at least as great as it is in the campaign 
contribution context — since an attempt to influence officials’ judgment is precisely the point of 
lobbying interactions, and a failure to regulate lobbying is just as likely to result in a cynical 
assumption that well-connected lobbyists, rather than voters, control elected officials’ policy 
178 See 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976). 
179 Id.
180
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181 Id. at 143 (2003) (quoting FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign, 533 U.S. 431, 441 
(2001)).
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decisions.  In fact, the Court in McConnell implicitly acknowledged as much, observing that the 
purpose of large campaign contributions, whose regulation it upheld as necessary to combat the 
appearance of undue influence, is to gain political access to elected officials;183 thus, it is 
difficult to imagine that the Court would now turn around and rule that reforms requiring 
disclosures about such political access itself are unconstitutional.
Despite these compelling governmental interests, however, opponents may argue that the 
proposed reforms violate the First Amendment because they (1) force lobbyists and interest 
groups to reveal their lobbying strategies, and thus might have a chilling effect on certain interest 
group or lobbyist behavior; (2) require disclosure of grassroots lobbying communications with 
members of Congress; and (3) violate associational rights by mandating identification of the 
members of lobbying coalitions and major contributors to interest groups that engage in 
lobbying.  These arguments are misguided.  As Bill Eskridge has noted in testimony concerning
the 1993 LDA, any useful disclosure requirement necessarily will reveal some interest group 
strategy and probably also will deter groups from making certain calculated moves.184  But this 
fact does not ipso facto render the requirement unconstitutional.  Interest groups, like all citizens, 
have a right to petition their government and to engage in political discussions with elected 
officials; they do not have a right to hide the fact that they have exercised their rights of petition
and political discussion, or the manner in which they have exercised these rights, from the rest of 
the citizenry — particularly where exposure of interest group strategy is itself likely to serve the 
public interest.  More specifically, the chilling effect argument against disclosure of elected 
officials’ lobbying contacts is unpersuasive for two reasons.  First, while an interest group 
understandably may prefer that its lobbying contacts remain secret, the prospect of disclosure 
generally should not destroy the value of the contact or cause the interest to abandon a particular 
strategy unless there was something dishonest or manipulative about the strategy in the first 
place.  “If you’re afraid to disclose what committee or agency you’re contacting, you might be 
up to no good.”185  It is not for nothing that Justice Brandeis observed that “[s]unlight is said to 
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”186  Indeed, arguing 
183 See, e.g., 540 U.S. at 147 n.46, 148-50 (“[T]hose checks open the doors to the offices of 
individual and important Members of Congress and the Administration . . .  Labor and business leaders 
believe – based on experience and with good reason – that such access gives them an opportunity to shape 
and affect governmental decisions.”) (“The majority of those who contribute to political parties do so for 
business reasons, to gain access to influential members of Congress” (quoting Hickmott Declaration cited 
in lower court opinion)).
184 See 1993 LDA Hearing, supra note 50, at 234, 249 (testimony of William N. Eskridge, Jr.).
185 Id. at 249-50.  Eskridge illustrates the point with a hypothetical involving a lobbyist, acting on 
behalf of Jane Doe Ministries, who makes an ex parte contact with the FCC and also contacts a staff 
member of the relevant House oversight committee.  Such disclosures would reveal the client’s strategy 
of working the FCC from within the agency as well as through congressional pressure.  Disclosure 
requirements that force the lobbyist to report the contacts with both the FCC and the committee may deter 
the lobbyist from engaging in this strategy, because the FCC might then discount any phone calls that it 
gets from the committee, given the revelation that the committee is acting at the lobbyist’s behest rather 
than based on its own conviction.  But if this is in fact what happens, Professor Eskridge observes, it may 
well be in the public’s best interest.  See id. at 249
186 LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 62 (1933 edition), quoted in Buckley v. Valeo, 
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against, or invalidating disclosure of lobbying contacts on this ground would be akin to 
invalidating source disclosure requirements in the campaign finance context because some 
interests might be dissuaded from running campaign advertisements on the theory that their 
message would be less effective if taken in light of its source.  Second, a similar chilling effect 
argument already has been rejected by the Supreme Court in Harriss, which held that any First 
Amendment restraint resulting from interest group reluctance to engage in lobbying activities for 
fear of disclosure consequences “is at most an indirect one resulting from self-censorship, 
comparable in many ways to the restraint resulting from criminal libel laws.”187  Again, to the 
extent that there are legitimate, retaliatory concerns that may result in the chilling of a pariah 
group’s lobbying activity, provision can be made in the disclosure requirements allowing 
lobbyists and elected officials to seek an FEC ruling excusing them from disclosing that 
particular interest’s information. 
The argument that mandatory disclosure of grassroots lobbying violates the First 
Amendment is similarly unconvincing.   The reforms proposed in this paper, and in the SILEAA
and LERA, would not require disclosure of communications from constituents — the 
“grassroots” — to Members of Congress.  Nor would they require revelation of interest groups’ 
membership lists or communications with their members.188  The proposed reforms would 
require disclosure only of communications made to the “grassroots” from lobbying organizations 
in an effort to drum up support for a particular position.  In other words, the disclosure sought in 
these reforms is of expenditures made to generate grassroots, or “astroturf”,189 activity.  There is 
no constitutional right to secrecy regarding the fact that a hired lobbyist has tried to persuade 
citizens of a particular viewpoint.190  On the other hand, there is a strong governmental interest in 
such disclosure because grassroots lobbying is a common lobbying tactic in the modern era,
omission of which would leave the public with an incomplete picture of the lobbying process.191
Further, as is the case with disclosures of lobbyists’ contacts with elected officials, if the mere 
prospect of disclosure deters lobbyists from engaging in grassroots lobbying, then this suggests 
that the grassroots tactic owes its effectiveness in part to misrepresentation, not that the 
regulation of grassroots lobbying is unconstitutional.
424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976).
187 See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954).
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H.R. 2412, 109th Cong., §107 (2005).
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 The term “astroturf” lobbying was coined to describe lobbyist efforts to orchestrate a fake, or 
less than completely accurate, showing of citizen support for a particular policy position, at the grassroots 
level, by advertising lobbying clients’ positions to the public and encouraging individual citizens to call 
or write their representatives expressing support for those positions. 
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 The analysis would be different if the party seeking secrecy were an individual citizen, 
expressing his or her own political views, who might be dissuaded from speaking without the benefit of 
anonymity.  See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334, 356 n.20 (1995) (overturning 
conviction of a private citizen who had circulated an unsigned leaflet opposing a local ballot measure on 
the ground that state law prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign literature unconstitutionally 
abridged citizens’ right of free speech, but specifically disassociating this ruling from lobbying context).
191 See, e.g., Faucheux, supra note 137, at 20.
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Finally, while regulations requiring disclosure of major contributors to a lobbying client 
and of the members of interest group coalitions do intrude on contributors’ and coalition 
members’ First Amendment rights, such reforms should survive constitutional scrutiny so long 
as they are tailored to serve the governmental interest in guarding against circumvention of 
disclosure requirements.  In fact, in the analogous campaign finance context, the Supreme Court 
specifically has recognized the validity of regulations designed to prevent the circumvention of 
other, first-order, regulations which themselves aim to combat the appearance of corruption.192
The Court similarly has suggested, in the context of direct democracy referenda, that regulations 
requiring disclosure of the identity of the proponents of a ballot question and the total amount of 
money spent for a petition campaign would be appropriately tailored to serve the state’s 
substantial interest in controlling special interests’ domination of the initiative process. 193  The 
government’s interest in preventing circumvention of lobbying disclosure laws should be 
considered as strong as its interest in preventing circumvention of campaign contribution limits 
or silent domination of the referendum process by interest groups:  Interest group circumvention 
of lobbying disclosure requirements both would give voters an incomplete picture of how 
particular lobbyists and groups interact with elected officials and would skew individual 
interests’ ability to compete effectively with their issue opponents; thus, the government cannot 
achieve its interest in “providing meaningful information” to the electorate unless it is permitted 
to require disclosure of interest group coalition members and major financial contributors to 
lobbyists’ clients.  Further, the lobbying reforms proposed herein are narrowly tailored to serve 
the government’s interests without unduly infringing upon First Amendment rights, in that they 
would require identification of the major players behind a lobbying client, while permitting de 
minimis contributors of less than $10,000 to remain unnamed.194
IV. GETTING LDA REFORMS ENACTED
It is, of course, easy for academics to sit back, survey the scene, and suggest grand 
proposals to reform ailing regulatory regimes.  Far more difficult is to propose reforms that have 
some chance of successful implementation.  This Part discusses the conditions necessary for 
reform of the LDA and contemplates the political developments that would need to take place in 
order for the proposed reforms to become enacted.
A. Keys to Convincing Congress 
1. Lessons From the Campaign Finance Context
An important starting point for anyone seeking to evaluate the likelihood that Congress 
will enact lobbying reforms requiring disclosures from elected officials, rather than merely from 
lobbyists, is to understand why Congress was willing, in the related campaign finance context, to 
enact regulations that require disclosures from candidates for elective office.  Put slightly 
192 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 143-44 (2003) (governmental interest in combating the 
appearance of corruption is sufficient to justify not only regulations imposing limits on campaign 
contributions, but laws preventing the circumvention of such limits by political actors) (citing cases).
193 See Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 202-03 (1999).
194 See discussion supra Section III.B.1.c, pp. __.
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differently, why did Congress impose disclosure requirements on public officials in the 
campaign finance context, but not do so in the lobbying context?  The answer, I believe, is 
twofold.  The first fold lies in differences between the manner and frequency with which 
campaign finance issues, versus lobbying process issues, are brought to the public’s attention.  
Campaign finance issues become part of the public consciousness, on some level, at least every 
two years — i.e., every time a national election takes place.  The public may pay more attention 
to campaign finance issues in certain election years than in others, but candidates’ fundraising 
efforts are a topic always in the news, at least in the background, during an election year. 
Concerns about the lobbying process, by contrast, rise to the level of news only in the wake of a 
scandal. Further, when scandals in either sphere grab headlines, the press tends to frame 
campaign finance abuses differently than it does lobbying abuses: Campaign finance abuses 
tend to be tied to the particular candidates or political parties who solicited and received the 
questionable contributions, whereas lobbying abuses tend to be tied more to the interest groups 
or lobbyists responsible for the questionable tactic.  Think, for example, of the Clinton 
Administration’s infamous sale of stays in the Lincoln Bedroom, versus the Keating savings and 
loan scandal in the late 1980s, which tellingly was named for the corrupt Lincoln Savings and 
Loan chairman, Charles Keating, rather than the elected officials involved.195  The recent scandal 
involving Representative DeLay is unusual in lobbying history for its focus on a particular 
elected official — and, not coincidentally, has prompted one of the only serious reform proposals
calling for disclosure of the specific elected officials whom lobbyists contact — but even this 
scandal has focused at least as much on the activities of lobbyist Jack Abramoff as it has on 
Representative DeLay.196  As a result of this media and congressional portrayal, lobbying abuses 
generally are viewed as the work of specific lobbyists, on behalf of specific interests, directed 
towards Congress as a whole, whereas campaign finance abuses are seen as stemming from the 
soliciting candidate’s campaigns.  Thus, elected officials are viewed as passive acceptors of 
lobbyist gifts, whose transgressions lie in taking advantage of lavish perks and allowing such 
gifts to influence them; while candidates campaigning for office are viewed as responsible for, if 
not the architects of, questionable contribution schemes.
The second reason for Congress’ willingness to impose disclosure requirements on its 
own members in the campaign finance context is more practical:  The majority of actors on the 
other side of campaign finance contributions are individual citizens, and Congress would have 
195
 Indeed, the five senators involved in the Keating scandal escaped virtually unscathed.  On of 
them, Senator John McCain, has gone on to become a champion of ethics reform in Congress.  
196 See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Lobbying Probe Spurs Request, ALBANY TIMES UNION, July 6, 2005, 
at A7 (discussing expansion of congressional investigation into wrongdoing by Abramoff, who worked 
closely with DeLay and paid for DeLay’s airfare on a trip to England as Scotland, as well as for an 
expensive skybox used by DeLay to entertain donors); Associated Press, House Breakthrough Could 
Lead to DeLay Probe, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, July 1, 2005, at 5D (noting that news organizations had 
uncovered documents showing connections between payments to DeLay and lobbyist Jack Abramoff); 
Coushatta Tribe Was Told to Reroute DeLay Money, FORT-WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, June 22, 2005, at 
A6 (discussing failure by DeLay political groups to disclose checks from Indian tribe connected to 
lobbyist Jack Abramoff); Les Blumenthal, Group Wants Hastings Off Panel, THE NEWS TRIBUNE, June 
10, 2005, at B02 (describing Abramoff as “the lobbyist at the center of DeLay’s problems”).
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come under serious political fire if it had sought to place the burden of disclosure on such 
citizens rather than on candidates running for elective office.  When the entity on the other side 
of a campaign contribution is not a citizen, but a PAC, campaign finance regulations do require 
disclosure from that entity in addition to candidate disclosure.  Further, even prior to enactment 
of campaign finance laws, candidates’ reelection committees kept track of contributions made to 
candidates’ campaigns; thus, candidate-side disclosure of campaign finance contributions did not 
require reinventing any wheels but could instead build upon existing internal records.
In sum, differences in public perception and presentation, combined with practical 
recordkeeping considerations, left Congress with no choice but to put candidates for elective 
office at the forefront of campaign finance disclosure rules; whereas in the lobbying context,
legislators were free to place the entire burden of disclosure on lobbyists alone.  
2. Engendering Public Support
Not surprisingly, then, one key ingredient for successful reform of the LDA is public 
perception and public support for specific reforms .  In order for elected officials to be persuaded 
to enact specific reforms — e.g., disclosure of lobbyist contacts with specific officials, 
disclosure by officials, disclosure of grassroots lobbying, stronger penalties and enforcement 
mechanisms — the public first must agitate against failures in the current lobbying regulation 
system that correspond to these reforms.  Instead of vague dissatisfaction with the lobbying 
system and criticism of the influence that interest groups exert over elected officials, the public 
would need to express concern or even ire about grassroots lobbying, inadequate oversight of 
compliance with lobbying disclosure rules, and the fact that lobbying regulations fail to require 
any information about lobbyist access to elected officials, let alone any disclosures by elected 
officials themselves.
Experience teaches that such specific public pressure is likely to occur only if one of two 
developments (or some combination thereof) takes place: (1) the public receives news of a large 
scandal involving grassroots lobbying, or particular officials’ contacts with lobbyists, or 
widespread noncompliance with lobbying regulations; (2) political elites — whether candidates 
for elective office, party heads, or heads of public interest organizations such as Ralph Nader —
orchestrate a national campaign highlighting deficiencies in the current LDA and calling for 
reforms akin to those proposed in this paper.  The power of a public scandal to prompt reforms 
tailored (sometimes myopically) to prevent recurrences of similar scandals in the future is 
historically obvious and needs little exposition.   The power of political elites to shape public 
opinion is perhaps less well understood, except by political scientists.  In brief, political theory 
holds that public opinions overwhelmingly are developed through heuristic cue-taking from 
political elites.197  The public pays little attention to political facts on its own; it becomes 
interested only when political actors, often in political speeches, make such facts symbolically 
threatening or reassuring — and even then the public responds to the cues from the political 
197 See, e.g., Kang, supra note 101, at 1162 (citing JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS 
OF MASS OPINION 40-52 (1992)).
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elites’ speeches, not to direct knowledge of the facts.198  Thus, efforts by political candidates, 
parties, or prominent political figures — e.g., Ralph Nader or Ross Perot — to connect public 
dissatisfaction with the lobbying process to a particular cause and to generate public support for 
specific reforms aimed at eradicating that cause — i.e., to make lobbying facts symbolically 
meaningful — could be the key to successful LDA reform.  This is precisely what happened in 
1992 when presidential candidate Ross Perot made revolving-door lobbying a campaign issue199
and roused public sentiment to such an extent that Bill Clinton also took on the cause  and, upon 
winning the election, issued an executive order restricting revolving-door lobbying by executive 
branch officials.200
The first condition for reform, public scandal, undoubtedly was satisfied this past summer 
(2005) by revelations of Representative Tom DeLay’s ethics violations concerning lobbyist-paid 
travel and other gifts.  Predictably, this scandal has inspired several reform proposals, including 
the SILEAA and LERA, which take the unusual step of calling for disclosures of lobbyist 
contacts with specific public officials.  But the second condition, support from political elites, 
also must exist if lobbying reform is to get past the proposal stage and become law.  Indeed, 
history teaches that championing by political elites actually is more important than the existence 
of a public scandal in effecting successful lobbying reform:  Despite numerous previous attempts 
at reform in the wake of lobbying scandals, Congress ultimately enacted the FRLA and the LDA, 
not in response to a public scandal, but as the result of internal pressure to reorganize the way 
Congress operated (1946),201 and public pressure, generated by political elites, to “change the 
way business is done in Washington” (1992 and 1994),202 respectively.
The requisite support from political elites does not, unfortunately, appear to exist at 
present. Various Senators and Representatives, including Meehan, Emmanuel, McCain, and 
Feingold, may have started the ball rolling, to some extent, with respect to proposals for 
grassroots lobbying, coalition identification, and disclosure by lobbyists of the specific officials 
with whom they meet.  But more championing from political elites is necessary if such reforms 
198 See EDELMAN, supra note 11, at 172.
199 See, e.g., Adam J. Rombel, Interest Group Politics in the Northeastern States (Book Review), 
SPECTRUM:  J. OF STATE GOV’T, Sept. 22, 1994, at 46 (Vol. 67) (observing that “Ross Perot’s 1992 
presidential campaign focused attention on the problem of lobbyists” by, inter alia, specifically criticizing 
the revolving door practice of government officials turning into lobbyists upon leaving government); Jane 
Bussey, U.S. Officials Who Quit To Lobby For Mexico Are Brought Under Fire, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 11, 
1992, at 3K (describing Perot campaign commercial criticizing former government officials who walked 
through the “revolving door” to become lobbyists after leaving office). 
200 See, e.g., David Corn, Beltway Bandits (Reversing the Reagan/Bush years), THE NATION, 
Nov. 23, 1992, at 620 (reporting that during the campaign Clinton, “stealing Ross Perot’s tune,” had 
“decried the revolving door through which government officials pass into positions as lobbyists” and was 
now making good on this promise by instituting an executive order forcing executive appointees to pledge 
not to lobby their agencies for five years after leaving their government posts).
201
 The FRLA was enacted as a last-minute add-on to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 
and was “in effect carried through on the coattails of the other congressional reforms regarded as most 
important by Congress.”  See Kennedy, supra note 83, at 548.
202 See sources cited supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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are to be successful.  The Democratic Party (insofar as it seeks to capitalize on the DeLay 
scandal) or public interest groups could be ideal candidates  for pushing forth the other reforms, 
particularly those relating to stronger penalties and transfer of enforcement authority to the FEC.  
Given legislators’ self-interested behavior, however, it is unlikely that any current member of 
Congress will take up the mantle in favor of disclosure by elected officials; thus, this reform 
likely would have to be brought to the fore by an outsider, akin to a Ross Perot in 1992, in order 
to succeed.  Newt Gingrich may perhaps be able to fulfill this role, if he is so inclined, given his 
name recognition and his penchant for no-nonsense comments such as, “You can’t have a 
corrupt lobbyist without a corrupt member or a corrupt staffer on the other end.”203
3. Political Reality
Because of legislator self-interest, Congress is certain to be reluctant to enact regulations 
that require its own members and staff to disclose their lobbying contacts.  Further, it is unlikely 
to be pleased at the prospect of a system that encourages additional interests to approach its 
members seeking face time equal or proportionate to that received by their competitors.  But if 
outside-the-beltway political elites akin to Ross Perot or Ralph Nader are willing and able to 
focus the public’s attention on the inequity and inadequacy of forcing lobbyists, but not elected 
officials, to make disclosures about their lobbying interactions, Congress nevertheless could find 
itself forced into imposing lobbying disclosure requirements o n its own members and other 
elected officials. Absent the generation by political elites of such public clamoring for elected 
official disclosures, the closest, second-best solution that we are likely to see is enactment of 
regulations requiring lobbyists to list the specific public officials with whom they meet, perhaps 
along with some estimate of the amount of time spent with those officials.  As discussed supra
Section III.B.1.a, such a disclosure requirement would not provide all of the benefits of 
disclosures by elected officials, but it would improve competing interests’ ability to monitor and 
match each others’ efforts, and thus would be a step in the right direction.
A. Interest Group Support
Madisonian ideals aside, we live in a Mancur Olson204 world, where wealthy, powerful, 
organized interests tend to exert disproportionate influence over the legislative process.  While 
Congress has proved capable of enacting lobbying reforms without the support of organized 
interests,205 the reforms proposed in this paper, particularly those calling for disclosure of 
203 Newt as Diogenes in a Dark Capitol, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 7, 2006, at A10.
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 Olson was a public choice theorist who famously argued that small interest groups with 
intensely held preferences, not necessarily in the public or majority interest, are the most likely to 
organize and, therefore, to wield disproportionate influence over legislative policy.  MANCUR OLSON, 
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:  PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (Harvard, 1965).
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 In 1993, for example, Congress successfully eliminated tax deductibility of lobbying expenses, 
despite lobbyist and interest group opposition; but this was an unusual case, in which elected officials and 
the public overwhelmingly supported the reform.  See, e.g., Michael Wines, Special Pleaders -- A 
Periodic Look at Lobbying: Lobbyists Scrambling to Kill A Clause That’s About Them, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
27, 1993, at A1; Joel Brinkley, Special Pleaders -- A Periodic Look at Lobbying:  Lobbyists Appear Inept 
When They’re the Issue, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1993, at A12.
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lobbyist contacts with specific elected officials on behalf of specific interests, would face an 
exceedingly uphill battle if opposed by those interests that currently hold the most power and 
access to legislators.  Thus, interest group reaction is an important factor to consider in 
evaluating the likelihood that the reforms proposed herein might successfully be enacted.  For 
the reasons outlined below, I believe that interest groups should be inclined to support the 
proposed reforms. 
First, special interests, and particularly those “Mancur-Olson” interests that are best 
organized and that currently receive  the most access to elected officials, may gain from having 
an official system that tracks access to lawmakers.  As discussed earlier, such a system would 
help organized interests legitimate their claims to group members that they have been successful 
in making their case to elected officials and in achieving desired group objectives.206
Second, it is likely that competing interests, like competitors in any business industry,
always will want more rather than less information about their competitors, even if it means 
having to give up information about themselves.  Indeed, in the economic marketplace, we have 
antitrust laws designed to restrict the sharing of competitive information precisely because we 
fear that if businesses have such information, they may collude or allocate their resources in too-
effective ways.  In the political marketplace, powerful, wealthy interest groups have similar 
incentives.  Such groups tend to have wide lobbying interests, and may obtain substantial
congressional deference in some contexts, but very little in others.  As a result, they may be 
willing to tolerate more transparency for their lobbying activities in sectors where they are 
winning in exchange for more transparency regarding their lobbying activities in sectors where 
they are losing.  To be sure, this would cause such interests to lose some effectiveness in areas 
where they currently are the only side being represented, but it also would enable them to gain 
effectiveness in other areas where they are underrepresented; this is a trade-off that at least some, 
if not most, interests may be willing to make.  It is only interests who constantly are winning all 
of their battles who might oppose reforms aimed at increasing transparency, and even such 
interests may believe that the time- lag between their lobbying activities and disclosure thereof
will be sufficient that they need not worry about reforms requiring greater disclosure.
Third, greater transparency may assist interests with coalition-building by revealing
additional groups with like interests or groups who have demonstrated access to a key influential 
legislator or committee.  The magnitude of this benefit may be limited to the extent that groups 
in an industry already are familiar with each other, but the proposed disclosures may at least help 
at the margins.  Fourth, interest groups should support the proposal that contacts between 
lobbyists and specific elected officials be disclosed because such disclosures will save interests 
some of the time and energy currently spent monitoring, tracking, and assessing the activities of 
government officials and will provide more accurate and thorough information about these 
activities.207
206 See discussion supra Section III.A, pp. 32-33.
207 See Robert H. Salisbury, Putting Interests Back Into Interest Groups, in CIGLER & LOOMIS, 
supra note 26, at 382.
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Even the proposal requiring disclosure of grassroots lobbying activities should not garner 
the interest group opposition that it did in 1995, so long as it exempts from disclosure 
communications between interest groups and their own members and otherwise protects 
membership lists from exposure.  A grassroots disclosure requirement along the lines of that 
proposed in the SILEAA and the LERA should satisfy such First Amendment concerns while 
still providing the information needed by competing interests. 
Conclusion
Interest group attempts to match each other’s efforts always will be a guessing game; 
lobbying disclosures by necessity will be retrospective, and thus will not enable interests to 
discover what lobbying contacts their opponents are engaging in at present, but only will reveal 
what access a group received in the last reporting period.  Further, interest groups always will be 
one step ahead of lobbying reforms and regulations, seeking new ways to avoid disclosing 
certain information; the hydraulics principle that as one hole is plugged, another will open,
certainly applies here.  Thus, lobbying reform may produce many unintended consequences; we 
may, for example, next see an increase in elected officials lobbying each other — e.g., Congress 
lobbying executive agencies, executive officials lobbying Congress — and/or a shift to lobbying 
of political parties rather than individual elected officials, in an effort to circumvent disclosure 
requirements. Accordingly, lobbying reforms should be enacted with the expectation that they 
will need to be reevaluated and revised in the not-too-distant future.
Thus, the reforms proposed in this paper are not offered as a panacea, or even as a 
permanent partial fix, for all that ails the lobbying process. Rather, they are intended as a step in 
the right direction, towards dynamic regulation of the lobbying process, in a manner that 
realistically accounts for and utilizes different political actors’ internal incentives to inspire more 
balanced legislating and, ideally, enhanced voter competence. 
